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SAFEGUARDING STATE INTERESTS IN HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE ESTABLISHMENT 
 
CHRISTINE H. MONAHAN* 
 
*** 
This Article documents how, contrary to popular narratives, the 
states were given and took advantage of numerous opportunities to weigh 
in on health insurance exchange implementation under the Affordable Care 
Act.  This engagement was driven by frequent informal consultation with 
federal officials, although states were also regular participants in regular 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  This Article identifies four factors that 
appear to have affected how much influence states were able to exercise 
over federal decision-making, and concludes by discussing how changing 
dynamics may encourage states to push for a more formal seat at the table 
in future exchange policy deliberations. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
News reporters and academic experts alike have heaped significant 
attention on the fact that the vast majority of states rejected the opportunity 
to run their own health insurance exchange under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), and instead opted for a federally operated exchange.1 While states 
                                                                                                                                      
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2016. I am indebted to the officials who 
shared their time and insights with me. I would also like to thank Professor Abbe 
Gluck for her supervision and guidance on this project, and my former colleagues 
at Georgetown’s Center on Health Insurance Reform for inspiring my research into 
state implementation of the Affordable Care Act. 
1 See, e.g., Sarah Dash et al., Health Policy Brief: Health Insurance Exchanges 
and State Decisions, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=96; SARAH 
DASH ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE ESTABLISHMENT (Geo. Univ. Health Pol’y 
Inst. Ctr. on Health Ins. Reforms ed., Apr. 2013); Sarah Kliff, It’s Official: The 
Feds Will Run Most Obamacare Exchanges, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/18/its-official-the-
feds-will-run-most-obamacare-exchanges/; David Morgan, Only 15 States Opt to 
Run Obamacare Exchanges, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 
100311739; Alex Wayne, Obama to Run Most Health Marketplaces as States Opt 
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likely considered many factors as they came to this decision,2 many 
ultimately were driven by partisan politics,3 and their vocal objections to 
these exchanges contributed to the popular conservative characterization of 
ACA implementation as a “federal takeover.”4 In light of state decisions to 
default to the federally run exchange, it is indisputable that the federal 
government has taken a larger role in the operation of exchanges than 
expected.5  
Yet, arguably as important as who is responsible for day-to-day 
operation of health insurance exchanges is who makes the rules governing 
health insurance exchanges, for they control the extent of flexibility states 
                                                                                                                                      
Out, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
12-14/obama-to-control-most-health-exchanges-as-states-opt-out.html. 
2 Dash et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act, supra note 1. 
3 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to 
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 
1920, 1948 (2014); David K. Jones et al., Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance 
Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 97 (2014); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State 
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 
796–803 (2012); Brendan W. Williams, A Better "Exchange": Some States, 
Including Washington, Control Their Health Care Markets While Most Surrender 
Autonomy to Resist Reform, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 595, 610–615 (2013); GOP States 
Offer Little Help to Health Care Exchanges, CBS ATLANTA (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2013/10/01/gop-states-offer-little-help-to-health-care-
exchanges/; Elizabeth Hartfield, Health Care Law: GOP Govs Opt Out of State 
Exchanges, ABC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2012/11/health-care-law-gop-govs-opt-out-of-state-exchanges/. 
4 See, e.g., 10 Reasons ObamaCare is a Government Takeover of Health Care, 
GALEN GUIDE NO. 2 (Galen Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Fall 2012, at 1 (“States are 
being treated like contractors to the federal government, not sovereign entities 
empowered by the Constitution. They are ordered to set up new exchange 
bureaucracies lest the federal government sweep in and do it for them.”); Michael 
F. Cannon, ObamaCare: A Federal Takeover, No Matter Who Runs the 
Exchanges, CATO INST. (March 15, 2011), http://www.cato.org/blog/obamacare-
federal-takeover-no-matter-who-runs-exchanges (“[U]nder ObamaCare the feds 
will write all the rules governing health insurance, so who administers the 
Exchanges is well-nigh irrelevant. ObamaCare is a federal takeover of health care, 
no matter who runs these new government bureaucracies that we call health 
insurance Exchanges.”). 
5 For example, originally all states but Alaska applied for and received federal 
grants to support planning for exchange establishment. DASH ET AL., 
IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 1, at 15. 
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running their own exchanges can have.  Here, Congress put the federal 
government in the driver’s seat by assigning the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsibility for issuing 
regulations regarding, among other things, the “establishment and 
operation of Exchanges,” “the offering of qualified health plans through 
such Exchanges,” and “such other requirements as the Secretary determines 
appropriate.”6 Reflecting the same federalism values that led to state-run 
exchange default,7 however, Congress also provided for a consultation role 
for state officials in the federal rulemaking process.8  
This Article describes how this consultation provision was 
implemented in the four years that followed enactment of the ACA, as the 
initial policies and operational decisions governing health insurance 
exchange establishment were made.  Given that Congress did not elaborate 
on how frequently the Secretary should consult with state representatives, 
the Secretary likely has discretion to keep her consultations largely pro 
forma and thus minimized state influence over federal policies.  Yet 
complicating the traditional “federal takeover” narrative that has 
accompanied exchange implementation, this Article demonstrates that 
states actually played an active and influential role in federal decision-
making processes.9  
                                                                                                                                      
6 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 
18041(a)(1) (2012). 
7 See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, 
Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1749, 1757 (2013) (“[E]xchange governance was the key question that divided the 
House and Senate versions of the legislation, with the Senate invoking ‘federalism’ 
values to insist on the state-leadership default preference that ultimately carried the 
day.”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV 567, 576 (“This reliance on state-run exchanges marks a significant 
difference between the Senate bill that became the ACA and the earlier House 
version. The latter had assigned primary responsibility for operating a national 
uniform exchange to the federal government, with states allowed to opt in to 
operate state-based exchanges if they met federal requirements. State officials 
lobbied strongly for state-based exchanges and for states to retain broad regulatory 
authority over insurance.” (footnotes omitted)). 
8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 
18041(a)(2) (2012). 
9 This Article complements other work questioning descriptions of the ACA as 
a “federal takeover” of insurance regulation. Of note, Professors Brendan Maher 
and Radha Pathak have argued that the ACA provides “an opening for state actors 
to exploit and reclaim their historic preeminence with respect to health insurance 
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In doing so, this Article contributes to a growing field of literature 
regarding whether states should have a special role in or access to federal 
deliberations that impact their interests and, if so, how this should be 
manifested in administrative procedures and/or judicial review.10 The 
normative arguments most frequently proffered in favor of a special role 
for states, as summarized in a recent article by Professor Miriam Seifter, 
include: advancing federalism interests,11 enhancing agency expertise,12 
and maintaining or enhancing democratic accountability.13 Critics do not 
necessarily challenge the desirability of these interests, but rather question 
the extent to which special procedural rules for states, in their current form 
or as proposed reforms, actually advance these interests in practice.14  
                                                                                                                                      
regulation” by “incorporat[ing] state preferences, grow[ing] state regulatory 
markets, and provid[ing] possibilities for state regulators to attract millions more to 
their spheres of influence.” Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About 
the Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 306, 307 (2013). 
10 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 
57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008) (arguing that administrative law can be used to advance 
federalism); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(arguing for judicial deference to agency interpretations that are born from bilateral 
intergovernmental bargaining); Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 443 (2014) (arguing that a robust state role in administrative 
decision-making could imperil administrative legitimacy without reform); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 
58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) (contending that, despite poor performance in the past, 
agencies can protect federalism interests if existing procedural rules are 
meaningfully enforced). 
11 Miriam Seifter, States As Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 
VA. L. REV. 953, 957 (2014) (“The most oft-cited goal of involving states in 
federal administration, mirroring a prevailing goal of contemporary federalism 
scholarship, is the protection of state power from federal excess.”). 
12 Id. (“[T]he idea is that state consultation will improve agencies' decisions by 
conveying states' local knowledge and experience as regulatory ‘laboratories.”). 
13 Id. (The idea “that states can be trusted with privileged access to agency 
decision making because, unlike private groups, states are ‘co-regulators’ and 
represent public constituencies themselves.”) 
14 For example, in the same article, Professor Seifter argues that state interest 
groups frequently serve as state representatives to federal agencies, but that their 
involvement “inevitably requires tradeoffs among the core goals at the intersection 
of administrative law and federalism.” Id. at 956. In an earlier work, Professor 
Seifter has argued that there is no basis for assuming that states will advance 
expertise- or public-interest-based agendas, or that their demands will necessarily 
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Ultimately, many underlying assumptions behind positive and negative 
assessments of state influence turn on largely un-tested empirical questions, 
such as: What formal and informal channels do states use to engage in 
federal administrative decision-making?  How frequently do states engage 
in federal decision-making processes?  Who, in fact, represents states in 
these processes (executive or legislative branch officials, or state interest 
groups, e.g., the National Governors Association and National Conference 
of State Legislatures)?  How much influence are any of these 
representatives able to exert?15  
Relatively little work has been done to answer these questions to 
date.16 This Article intends to fill this gap by documenting state 
                                                                                                                                      
reflect Congressional intent as others have opined. Seifter, supra note 10, at 491–
501; cf. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 695, 718 (2008) (arguing that “[a]s an institution with a specialized 
focus, an agency is not likely to possess the broader institutional mission, or the 
expertise necessary, to consider the appropriate balance of authority between the 
federal government and the states or the benefits of preserving some degree of state 
autonomy.”); Ryan, supra note 10, at 10–11 (arguing that the outcomes of 
bargaining between states and federal agencies should be considered a legitimate 
interpretation of federalism so long as the negotiations are based on mutual consent 
and federalism values, including the maintenance of checks and balances, 
accountability and transparency, preference for local innovation and competition, 
and problem-solving). 
15 Cf. Metzger, supra note 10, at 2085 (referencing Nina A. Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 758–59 (2004)) (“Professor 
Nina Mendelson has correctly insisted that the ability of states to protect their 
regulatory interests through notice-and-comment rulemaking is largely an 
empirical question, as are claims about the extent of state influence on federal 
agency decision-making.”). 
16 Seifter, supra note 10, at 445 (“Scholars of the administrative process . . . 
have scarcely studied the state role in federal regulation.”). Notable exceptions 
include Professor Seifter’s subsequent article documenting state interest group 
engagement in federal administrative processes, Seifter, supra note 11; Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012) (examining 
five agencies’ efforts to comply with Executive Order 13,132 following issuance 
of President Obama’s Memorandum on Preemption); and JOHN D. NUGENT, 
SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN 
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009) (demonstrating how states promote their 
interests in both federal legislative and administrative processes). Additionally, for 
examples of work in the overlapping field of environmental law and administrative 
federalism, see Heather Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An 
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1902 n.86 (2014). 
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engagement in federal decision-making with respect to health insurance 
exchanges.  In so doing, this Article relies on both formal written records 
evidencing state engagement in rulemaking and interviews with a number 
of state officials and state interest group representatives.  While the 
interviews are not representative of every state or every state official’s 
experience and perspective, they help cast light on informal state-federal 
agency relationships that are not captured as part of any lasting public 
record.17 And, while this Article cannot definitively say that state 
engagement was the “but-for” cause of final decisions by federal officials,18 
the interviews herein provided insight into factors that likely affected how 
much influence states were able to exert. 
Before proceeding into the research findings, Part II briefly 
describes the administrative procedural rules by which state and federal 
officials interacted.  Given that the ACA did not elaborate on how federal 
officials should consult with states, federal officials were only legally 
constrained by pre-existing framework laws and orders governing 
administrative interactions with states.  As Part II shall explain, despite 
multiple Executive Orders expounding the importance of considering state 
interests in federal rulemaking, existing law sets few formal requirements 
on agencies that appear to have any great impact on their actions.  Indeed, 
perhaps most important to state-federal interactions is a provision of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which facilitates off-the-record 
communication between federal officials and state officials. 
Part III begins to fill the aforementioned research gap by 
examining actual state engagement in federal decisions governing 
exchange implementation.  As mentioned above, it is informed by a review 
of publicly available materials, including public comments on federal 
rulemaking, and interviews with state officials and representatives of state 
interest groups, as well as two former federal officials, all of whom were 
active in exchange policymaking deliberations.19  
This research suggests that states were given and took advantage of 
numerous opportunities, both formal and informal, to weigh in on exchange 
implementation.20 In fact, state officials frequently spoke positively of the 
                                                                                                                                      
17 Cf. Seifter, supra note 10, at 465. 
18 Indeed, it has been observed that “measuring regulatory influence in any 
context is notoriously difficult.” Id. at 473–74. 
19 For a detailed discussion of methodology and limitations, see infra App. A. 
20 For clarity sake, this Article departs from the technical meanings of 
“formal” and “informal” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Formal 
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federal government’s willingness to work with them and accommodate 
their needs and preferences.  The Center for Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight (CCIIO)—the office within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) charged with implementing the ACA’s 
insurance reform provisions—received particular praise from states.  
Notably, state participation and positive experiences extended beyond the 
states that ultimately chose to operate their own exchanges: many states 
that may be commonly perceived as critics or opponents of exchanges 
because they chose to default to a federally run exchange and/or signed on 
to anti-ACA litigation nonetheless actively engaged in both formal and 
informal lobbying and developed close working relationships with federal 
officials. 
Part IV discusses multiple factors that appeared to affect how much 
influence states could exert over federal decision-making.  First, state 
officials frequently described how their ability to influence the federal 
government was connected to the extent to which the federal government 
perceived that the state shared the ACA’s goals of increasing access to 
health coverage and expanding consumer protections in the insurance 
market.  Second, restraints on federal financial resources and capacity 
appeared to both encourage and limit state influence in different ways. 
Third, institutional characteristics of the federal agencies and their different 
sub-components appeared to make them more or less amenable to state 
influence.  Fourth, and finally, states could enhance their influence when 
they were able to act as first-movers. 
Part V briefly discusses changing dynamics in health insurance 
exchange policy and politics and suggests that a continued reliance on 
informal processes could imperil state interests going forward.  It concludes 
the Article by finding that while informality has arguably served state 
officials well to date, any gains acquired through informal processes can 
also be taken away without the federal government having to turn to any 
formal procedures.  Accordingly, to the extent states want to secure any 
advances they have made, they may want to consider pushing for a more 
formal seat at the table in the future.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                      
proceedings, as used here, generally refer to informal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures under the APA. Informal proceedings refer to off-the-
record communications between state and federal officials, which may occur by 
telephone or in-person at meetings.  
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II. THE ROLE OF STATES IN CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 
 
The primary mechanism for stakeholders to engage in federal 
policymaking decisions is participation in notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Stakeholders, including states, can learn of pending action, provide written 
comments either supporting or opposing the proposed rule, and encourage 
other parties who may share their interests, such as their congressional 
delegation, to weigh in as well.21 In light of the arguably special role of 
states, federal policymakers have also adopted various federalism-
promoting procedural requirements to try to give special attention or access 
to state interests.  Generally, though, these efforts are heavy on rhetoric 
regarding the importance of respecting state interests, while continuing to 
leave decisions about when and how to consult with states to the discretion 
of administrative officials. 
Executive Order 12,372, Intergovernmental Review of Federal 
Programs (1982), broadly requires federal agencies to provide 
“opportunities for consultation” by state elected officials when they would 
be directly affected by proposed federal financial assistance or 
development programs.22 To effectuate this consultation requirement, 
federal agencies are told to communicate with state officials “as early in the 
program planning cycle as is reasonably feasible to explain specific plans 
and actions” and “make efforts” to accommodate any concerns states 
raise.23 
Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review (1993), 
expands the command to federal agencies to consult with state officials 
beyond federal programs (and beyond the limit that such officials be 
“elected”), providing that “[w]herever feasible, [federal] agencies shall 
seek views of appropriate State, local, and tribal officials before imposing 
regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect those 
governmental entities.”24  Executive Order 12,866 also encourages agencies 
to consider using “consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, 
                                                                                                                                      
21 Metzger, supra note 10, at 2086. 
22 Exec. Order No. 12,372 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 197, 197 (1983) (as amended by Exec. 
Order No. 12,416, 3 C.F.R. 186 (1984)), reprinted as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 6506 
(2012). 
23 Id. § 2(b), (c), 3 C.F.R. at 197.  
24 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(9), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802––06 (2012).  
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including negotiated rulemaking.”25 Negotiated rulemaking occurs when an 
advisory committee is convened to “consider and discuss issues for the 
purpose of reaching a consensus in the development of a proposed rule.26 
An outside facilitator leads the process and any consensus is ultimately 
incorporated into a proposed rule that then goes through normal notice-and-
comment rulemaking.27 While not limited to such purposes, Professor Erin 
Ryan has argued that negotiated rulemaking “holds promise for facilitating 
sound administrative policymaking in disputed federalism contexts”28 by 
ensuring “that agency personnel will be unambiguously informed about the 
full federalism implications of a proposed rule by the impacted state 
interests.”29 
Executive Order 13,132, Federalism (1999), goes another step 
further to state that “[t]he national government should be deferential to the 
States when taking action that affects the policymaking discretion of the 
States and should act only with the greatest caution where State or local 
governments have identified uncertainties regarding the constitutional or 
statutory authority of the national government.”30 Specifically with respect 
to consultation, Executive Order 13,132 generally requires federal agencies 
to refrain from promulgating any rules that have “federalism implications” 
unless the federal government consults with state officials while developing 
the proposed rule and publishes a “federalism summary impact statement” 
describing such consultation and discussing any concerns raised by state 
officials.31  
Finally, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
both limits federal imposition of financial burdens on states and strengthens 
the relationships between federal and state governments.  While many of 
UMRA’s directives are targeted at Congress, the law also addresses federal 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Id. § 6(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 645.  
26 5 U.S.C. § 562(7) (2012). 
27 Id. § 566. 
28 Ryan, supra note 10, at 51. 
29 Id. at 53. Ryan further notes that “state-side federalism bargainers” 
consistently reported a preference for negotiated rulemaking over traditional 
notice-and-comment rulemaking for this reason. Id. at 54. 
30 Exec. Order 13,132 § 2(i), 3 C.F.R. 206, 207 (2000), reprinted as amended 
in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 807–809 (2012).  
31 Id. § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 209–10. However, if the regulation imposes substantial 
direct compliance costs on states but does not preempt state law, federal agencies 
may bypass these requirements if, instead, the federal governments pays such costs 
on behalf of the states. Id. § 6(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 209.  
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agencies in two ways.  First, building on Executive Order 12,866, UMRA 
requires agencies to provide written statements detailing the costs and 
benefits of any “significant” federal mandate that may result in the 
expenditure by state, local, or tribal governments of at least $100 million 
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.32 Second, to promote free-
flowing communication, UMRA requires agencies to develop an “effective 
process” for state elected officers, among others, to “provide meaningful 
and timely input in the development of regulatory proposals containing 
significant Federal intergovernmental mandates,”33 and exempts meetings 
between federal officials and state elected officers and/or their designated 
employees from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA), such as notice and disclosure rules.34  
While these Executive Orders and UMRA give lip service to 
accommodating state interests and concerns, they arguably offer little by 
way of hard requirements.  The rulemaking agency is generally given 
discretion regarding whether consultation is necessary or feasible.  The 
rulemaking agency also is the entity to determine what the process of 
consultation should look like when it occurs, with minimal oversight of 
their decisions or practices.35 Empirical research supports a finding that, at 
least historically, these requirements have had little teeth.  For example, a 
study by Professor Nina Mendelson found that only six out of 600 
proposed or final rules issued during one quarter of 2003 included or 
referred to a completed federalism impact analyses; an updated sampling in 
May 2006 delivered similar results.  She further noted that, when 
federalism impact analyses were prepared, “[n]early all were of low 
quality, failing to analyze state interests in providing additional protection 
for residents, state autonomy, or any [other federalism values].”36 
Similarly, use of negotiated rulemaking by federal agencies remains rare: 
                                                                                                                                      
32 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012).  
33 Id. § 1534(a). 
34 Id. § 1534(b). 
35 For example, under Executive Order 13,132, an agency must include a 
certification of compliance with the federalism requirements in a final rule that the 
agency has determined has federalism implications when such rule is otherwise 
subject to review prior to promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget 
under Executive Order 12,866. Exec. Order 13,132 § 8(a), 3 C.F.R. at 210; see also 
Sharkey, supra note 10, at 2177–78 (criticizing executive enforcement of 
Executive Order 13,132). 
36 Mendelson, supra note 14, at 718–19 (2008) (referencing Mendelson, supra 
note 15, at 771, 782–83). 
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according to Professor Erin Ryan, “in the first thirteen years surrounding 
passage of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, only fifty federal rules were 
produced through negotiated rulemaking—as little as one percent of the 
total number of rules promulgated over this period.”37 
The tide may have begun to turn, at least temporarily, under 
President Obama, however.  Shortly after taking office, he issued a 
memorandum to his agency heads encouraging precaution when 
regulations could preempt state law and careful compliance with Executive 
Order 13,132.38 The memorandum reportedly “led to serious internal 
review” and policy changes within at least some federal agencies, including 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission.39  
Additionally, the potential impact of UMRA’s exception of state 
officials from FACA should not be dismissed.  While it does not require 
state engagement in federal policymaking, it can give state officials 
privileged access to federal policymakers as rules are being developed. 
Based on in-depth studies of state interactions with the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Professor Miriam Seifter has observed that state 
influence largely “appears to come through states' informal and largely 
subterranean consultations with agencies--through agency-state 
‘workgroups,’ meetings, and regular conference calls arising from states' 
status as ‘co-regulators’ in federal programs.”40   
Outside the scope of formal rules, states may also use their unique 
public position and authority to sway federal regulators.  For example, state 
officials may attempt to leverage their congressional delegations to gain 
influence.  Federal agencies are particularly responsive to members of 
Congress and, given legislators’ responsiveness to their home state 
governments, “[a]gency officials’ desire to please important constituencies 
in Congress thus will lead them to seek to please the governments of the 
states with home they deal.”41 Similarly, state officials may “adopt public 
                                                                                                                                      
37 Ryan, supra note 10, at 55. 
38 Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20, 2009). 
39 CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL 
AGENCY PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2, available at 
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sharkey-Executive-
Summary.pdf. 
40 Seifter, supra note 10, at 461. 
41 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 6 (2012). 
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relations campaigns to draw attention to their disagreements with proposed 
or existing federal policies, exhorting policymakers to act in a more state-
friendly way.”42 State and federal officials also may vie for policymaking 
control over a given area and put out competing regulations.  When facing 
a state that has already taken action in an area, the federal government may 
simply acquiesce to their policy decisions rather than attempt to preempt 
them.43 
 
III. STATE ENGAGEMENT IN FEDERAL DECISION-MAKING 
ON EXCHANGES 
  
 This Part discusses different channels and methods states used to 
influence federal rules and guidance on or related to exchange 
implementation.  It finds that states, including those that did not elect to 
operate state-based exchanges, were actively involved in this process 
through both formal and informal channels.  The federal government 
provided numerous opportunities for states to weigh in through notice-and-
comment rulemaking and other solicitations published in the Federal 
Register, and states frequently responded with detailed letters expressing 
their preferences and concerns.  Of even greater value to states was the near 
constant informal communications between states and federal officials. 
States also regularly relied on state interest groups, like the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and informal cross-state 
collaboration to amplify their voices through both formal and informal 
communication channels. 
 
A. FORMAL ENGAGEMENT: NOTICE-AND-COMMENT 
RULEMAKING 
 
The federal government has engaged in frequent rulemaking with 
respect to health insurance exchanges between March 23, 2010 and May 
30, 2014.  The following sections discuss this process as well as the 
response from states to opportunities to provide comments. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
42 NUGENT, supra note 16, at 58. 
43 Professor Erin Ryan has referred to this as “intersystemic signaling.” Ryan, 
supra note 10, at 70. 
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1. Federal Use of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
 
Since enactment of the ACA, the federal government has published 
more than forty actions in the Federal Register directly or tangentially 
related to the establishment or operation of exchanges.44 The Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within HHS, is the most frequent 
publisher, although some actions have come out of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) or directly from HHS.45 
Prior to engaging in any rulemaking related to exchanges, the 
federal government issued a request for comments soliciting input on 
twelve topics: state exchange planning and establishment grants, 
implementation timeframes and considerations, state exchange operations, 
qualified health plans (QHPs), quality, an exchange for non-electing states, 
enrollment and eligibility, outreach, rating areas, consumer experience, 
employer participation and risk adjustment reinsurance, and risk 
corridors.46 While all stakeholders were invited to respond, many of the 
questions were either explicitly targeted at soliciting state views on their 
                                                                                                                                      
44 See infra App. A. 
45 The first action, requesting comments regarding exchanges, was published 
by the Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, within HHS. 
Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges; Request for Comments 
Regarding Exchange-Related Provisions in Title I of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,584 (Aug. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 170). This independent office was subsequently converted into the 
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) and placed 
under CMS’s jurisdiction. Arthur D. Postal, HHS Overhauls Consumer Office, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/01/06/hhs-
overhauls-consumer-office. 
46 Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges; Request for 
Comments Regarding Exchange-Related Provisions in Title I of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 45,586–90. 
388 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 21.2 
 
needs and preferences,47 or requested information about state policies and 
operations.48  
Subsequently, the federal government solicited formal comments 
twenty-seven times on issues broadly related to exchange 
implementation.49 Most (eighteen) of these opportunities were in the form 
of proposed rules or notices of proposed rulemaking, allowing interested 
parties to provide comments before anything was finalized.  One was a 
request for information regarding health care quality standards for plans 
offered through exchanges.  In an additional two cases, CMS issued notices 
in the Federal Register soliciting comments on potential action it was 
considering (specifically, recognizing a new organization as an accrediting 
entity for the purpose of QHP certification and developing a sound 
framework for rating the quality of QHPs). 
In five cases, the government solicited comments on interim final 
rules.50 While the public had an opportunity to provide comments, the 
interim final provisions (which in some cases encompassed the whole rule, 
and in others were just sections of a rule that otherwise was being finalized 
without an additional comment opportunities) were finalized and scheduled 
to go into effect before consideration of any comments.  In many of these 
instances, the federal government departed significantly from an approach 
raised in the proposed rule, but found cause to finalize the new language 
without going through another round of notice-and-comment rulemaking.51  
                                                                                                                                      
47 E.g., id. at 45,586 (“What factors are States likely to consider in determining 
whether they will elect to offer an Exchange by January 1, 2014?”); id. at 45,587 
(“What are the tradeoffs for States to utilize a Federal IT solution for operating 
their Exchanges, as compared to building their own unique systems to conform to 
the current State environment?”); id. at 45,588 (“What are the verification and data 
sharing functions that States are capable of performing to facilitate the 
determination of Exchange eligibility and enrollment?”). 
48 E.g., id. at 45,588 (“To what extent do States currently have similar 
requirements or standards for plans in the individual and group markets?”); id. at 
45,589 (“To what extent do States currently utilize established premium rating 
areas? What are the typical geographical boundaries of these premium rating areas 
(e.g., Statewide, regional, county, etc.)?”); id. (“To what extent do States currently 
offer reinsurance in the health insurance arena (e.g., Medicaid, State employee 
plans, etc.) or in other arenas?”). 
49 See infra App. B. 
50 Id. 
51 For example, in the final and interim final rules on exchange establishment, 
HHS notes, “Based on the comments that we received on the Exchange 
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In one instance, the IRS issued a final regulation but solicited additional 
written comments on subject matter to be addressed through future 
rulemaking.52   
The comment periods for actions released in 2010 and 2011 were 
all at least sixty days in length, while many of the later rules provided much 
shorter comment periods (Table 1).  At the most extreme, one interim final 
rule provided for only a six-day comment period.53 More common were 
comment periods between twenty-one and thirty days in length.54 Rules 
would often also come out in batches, with multiple rules published on or 
around the same day.55 While this provided the public a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issues under development, it also 
increased the amount of work for respondents in that time period.  Indeed, 
after the federal government released five major exchange-related 
regulations over a one-month time period in the summer of 2011, it bowed 
                                                                                                                                      
establishment and eligibility proposed rules, we believe that there are new options 
and specific standards that should be implemented in connection with eligibility 
determinations.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers; Final 
Rule and Interim Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,434 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155,156, 157). However, citing timing constraints and 
concerns that “it would be contrary to the public interest to delay issuing new 
eligibility determination and timeliness standards,” HHS chose to waive proposed 
rulemaking. Id. 
52 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,380 (May 
23, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602) (“The final regulations authorize 
the Commissioner to publish additional guidance, see § 601.601(d)(2), to address 
the effect on affordability of wellness incentives that increase or decrease an 
employee’s share of premiums. Comments are requested on types of wellness 
incentives, how these programs affect the affordability of eligible employer-
sponsored coverage for employees and related individuals, and how incentives are 
earned and applied.”). 
53 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Maximizing January 1, 2014 
Coverage Opportunities, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,212, 76,212 (Dec. 17, 2013) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156). This rule, published on December 17, 
2013 (although available for review online briefly beforehand), changed the 
effective coverage date for any QHP purchased through a federally facilitated 
exchange between December 15, 2013 and December 23, 2013 from February 1, 
2014 to January 1, 2014. The rule provided states operating their own exchanges 
with the authority to make a similar change as well. Id. at 76,213–14. 
54 See infra App. B.  
55 Id. 
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to public pressure and extended the comment period on the initial rules 
from seventy-five to 108 days.56 Sometimes comments were due over 
major holidays.  For example, in the winter of 2012, deadlines for two 
proposed rules and one request for information fell on or between 
December 26, 2012 and December 31, 2012.57 
 
Table 1. Length of Exchange-Related Comment Periods by Year 
Solicitation and Issuing Agency* Action Days 
2010 
OCIIO: Exchange-Related Provisions in Title I of the ACA RFC 62 
2011 
CMS/Treas: Application, Review, & Reporting Process for 
Waivers for State Innovation PR 60 
HHS: Establishment of Exchanges & QHPS PR 108^ 
HHS: Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors, & Risk 
Adjustment PR 108^ 
HHS: Exchange Functions in the Indiv. Market; Elig. 
Determinations; Standards for Employers PR 75 
CMS: Medicaid Program; Elig. Changes Under the ACA PR 75 
IRS: Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit NPRM 75 
2012 
CMS: Medicaid Program; Elig. Changes Under the ACA FR/IFR 45 
HHS: Establishment of Exchanges & QHPs; Exchange 
Standards for Employers 
FR/IF
R 45 
IRS: Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit FR 90 
HHS: Recognition of Entities for the Accreditation of QHPs PR 30 
HHS: Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial 
Value, & Accreditation PR 30 
CMS: Health Care Quality for Exchanges RFI 30 
                                                                                                                                      
56 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans, and Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors 
and Risk Adjustment; Extension of Comment Period, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,788, 
60,788–89 (Sept. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 153, 155, 156). 
Notably, this extension was announced mere days before the original due date for 
comments on the exchange establishment and risk adjustment proposed rules. 
57 See infra App. B. 
2015 SAFEGUARDING STATE INTERESTS 391 
 
 
 
Solicitation and Issuing Agency* Action Days 
CMS: HHS Notice of Benefit & Payment Parameters for 2014 PR 24 
2013 
CMS: EHB in Alternative Benefit Plans, Elig. Notices, Fair 
Hearing & Appeal Processes for Medicaid & Exchange Elig. 
Appeals & Other Provisions 
PR 22 
CMS: Exchange Functions: Elig. for Exemptions; Misc. Min. 
Essential Coverage Provisions PR 45 
CMS: Amdts. to the HHS Notice of Benefit & Payment 
Parameters for 2014 IFR 50 
CMS: Establishment of Exchanges & QHPs; Small Business 
Health Options Program PR 21 
CMS: Exchange Functions: Standards for Navigators & Non-
Navigator Assistance Personnel PR 31 
IRS: Min. Value of Eligible Employer-Sponsored Plans & 
Other Rules  NPRM 60 
CMS: Program Integrity: Exchange, SHOP, Premium 
Stabilization Prgms & Market Standards PR 30 
IRS: Information Reporting for Affordable Insurance 
Exchanges NPRM 63 
CMS: AAAHC App. To Be a Recognized Accrediting Entity 
for the Accreditation of QHPs N 32 
CMS: Exchanges & QHPs, Quality Rating System, Framework 
Measures & Methodology  N 63 
CMS: HHS Notice of Benefit & Payment Parameters for 2015 PR 24 
CMS: Maximizing January 1, 2014 Coverage Opportunities IFR 6 
2014 
CMS: Third Party Payment of QHP Premiums  IFR 60 
CMS: Exchange & Insurance Market Standards for 2015 & 
Beyond PR 31 
* Regulation names are shortened for brevity. A full list of exchange-related solicitations and 
rulemaking is available in Appendix B. 
^ The original comment period for this proposed rule was seventy-five days.  However, the federal 
government subsequently extended it to 108 days. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, and Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk 
Corridors and Risk Adjustment; Extension of Comment Period, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,788, 60,788–89 (Sept. 
30, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 153, 155, 156).  
FR = Final Rule 
IFR = Interim Final Rule 
N = Notice (with comment) 
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NPRM = Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
PR = Proposed Rule 
RFC/RFI=Request for Comments/Information 
 
The federal government has conducted an immense amount of 
rulemaking in the past four years—as one state official commented in an 
interview, “the speed with which [CMS] get[s] out regulations is 
astonishing . . . it took them five years to issue some of the interim final 
regulations for HIPAA.”58 However, as much if not more information has 
been released only as sub-regulatory guidance documents.  Guidance 
documents listed under the “Health Insurance Marketplaces” (the federal 
government’s term for health insurance exchanges) and “Plan 
Management” sections of CCIIO’s “Regulations and Guidance” webpage 
vastly outnumber regulations, which include both proposed and final 
versions of many rules,59 and hundreds if not thousands of additional 
resources targeted towards states and insurance companies are only 
available on password protected websites.60 While a few guidance 
documents include solicitations for comments,61 transparency-and 
deliberation-forcing rules in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do 
                                                                                                                                      
58 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
59 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Regulations and Guidance, 
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/index. 
html (last visited May 14, 2014). 
60 See COLLABORATIVE APPLICATION LIFECYCLE TOOL (CALT), 
https://calt.cms.gov/ (last visited May 21, 2015); REGISTRATION FOR TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PORTAL (REGTAP), https://www.regtap.info (last visited May 22, 
2015) (unlike CALT and SERVIS, members of the public can register to access 
REGTAP); STATE EXCHANGE RESOURCE VIRTUAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 
(SERVIS), https://servis.cms.gov/resources/ (last visited May 14, 2014). 
61 See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-
FACILITATED EXCHANGES (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/ffe-guidance-05-16-
2012.pdf; Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., Affordable Exchanges Guidance: Letter to Issuers on 
Federally-facilitated and State Partnership Exchanges (Mar. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/ 
draft-issuer-letter-3-1-2013.pdf. 
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not apply, so the federal government is under no obligation to consider or 
publish feedback.62 
 
2. Federalism Analyses in Rulemaking 
 
In the majority (thirty) of Federal Register publications, the federal 
government has included an explicit Federalism Impact Statement.63 
Examining federalism discussions in final and interim final rulemaking 
specifically, however, demonstrates some inconsistency in how the 
requirements of Executive Order 13,132 are met (Table 2).  First, while 
CMS and HHS addressed the federalism implications of its rules either in 
an explicit Federalism Impact Statement or briefly within a more general 
Regulatory Impact Statement, the IRS did not include any references to 
federalism generally or Executive Order 13,132 specifically in any of its 
exchange-related rulemaking, including regulations enacting information 
reporting requirements on state-run exchanges.64  
 
Table 2. Federalism Impact Statements and Related Findings in 
Exchange-Related Final and Interim Final Rules 
Rule* FI
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2012 
CMS/Treas: App., Review, & 
Reporting Process for Waivers 
for State Innovation 
N -- N -- -- 
CMS: Medicaid Program; Elig. 
Changes Under the ACA (Final 
Rule/IFR) 
Y Neither Y -- -- 
HHS: Standards Related to N -- -- -- -- 
                                                                                                                                      
62 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
63 See infra App. B. 
64 Information Reporting for Affordable Insurance Exchanges, 79 Fed. Reg. 
26113 (May 7, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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Reinsurance, Risk Corridors & 
Risk Adjustment 
HHS: Establishment of 
Exchanges & QHPS; Exchange 
Standards for Employers (Final 
Rule/IFR) 
Y Cert’d N^ -- Y 
IRS: Health Insurance 
Premium Tax Credit (2012) N -- -- -- -- 
HHS: Data Collection to 
Support Standards Related to 
EHBs; Recognition of Entities 
for the Accreditation of QHPs 
Y Cert’d N N N 
2013 
IRS: Health Insurance 
Premium Tax Credit (2013) N -- -- -- -- 
HHS: Standards Related to 
EHBs, Actuarial Value, and 
Accreditation 
Y Neither N Y Y 
CMS: HHS Notice of Benefit 
& Payment Parameters for 2014 Y Attested N -- Y 
CMS: Amdts. to the HHS 
Notice of Benefit & Payment 
Parameters for 2014 (IFR) 
N -- N N Y 
CMS: Establishment of 
Exchanges & QHPs; Small 
Business Health Options 
Program 
Y Cert’d N N N 
CMS: Exchange Functions: 
Elig. for Exemptions; Misc. 
Min. Essential Coverage 
Provisions 
Y Cert’d N -- Y 
CMS: EHB in Alternative 
Benefit Plans, Elig. Notices, 
Fair Hearing & Appeal 
Processes, & Premiums & Cost 
Y Cert’d N -- Y 
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Sharing; Exchanges: Elig. & 
Enrollment 
CMS: Exchange Functions: 
Standards for Navigators and 
Non-Navigator Assistance 
Personnel 
Y Both -- Y -- 
CMS: Program Integrity: 
Exchange, SHOP, & Elig. 
Appeals 
Y Both Y Y Y 
CMS: Program Integrity: 
Exchange, Premium 
Stabilization Programs, & 
Market Standards 
Y Both Y Y Y 
CMS: Maximizing Jan. 1, 2014 
Coverage Opportunities (IFR) Y Cert’d N^ N N 
2014 
CMS: HHS Notice of Benefit 
& Payment Parameters for 2015 Y Attested N -- Y 
CMS: Third Party Payment of 
QHP Premiums (IFR) Y Cert’d N^ N N 
IRS: Info. Reporting for 
Exchanges (2014) N -- -- -- -- 
CMS: Exchange and Insurance 
Market Standards for 2015 & 
Beyond 
Y Both -- Y -- 
Totals 15 13 3 5 9 
* Unless otherwise noted, all rules were issued as final. Regulation names are shortened for brevity. A 
full list of exchange-related solicitations and rulemaking is available in Appendix B.  
^ In these rules, the drafters limited their finding by noting that the rule does not impose any costs on 
state or local governments not otherwise imposed by already-finalized provisions of the regulations 
implementing the Affordable Care Act. 
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Second, even when CMS and HHS frequently included a 
discussion of federalism concerns, they did not appear to apply consistent 
processes for confirming that they were complying with the Executive 
Order.  For example, federalism was usually discussed in a Federalism 
Impact Statement, but on two instances regulators only briefly dismissed 
any federalism concerns within the Regulatory Impact Statement.65 In 
addition, where a Federalism Impact Statement was included, HHS usually 
attested or certified that CMS had complied with the requirements of the 
Executive Order in a meaningful and timely manner.  On two instances, 
however, compliance was not confirmed despite findings that the rule 
either imposed direct costs on states66 or that it had preemption and other 
federalism implications.67  
Third, CMS and HHS frequently did not address all three prongs of 
the standard used to determine whether certain requirements of the 
Executive Order applied to a given rule.  The standard, as interpreted by 
HHS, asks whether a rule 1) imposes substantial direct costs on State and 
local governments; 2) preempts State law, or 3) otherwise has federalism 
implications.68 Most frequently, the federal government would find that a 
rule had federalism implications “due to direct effects on the distribution of 
power and responsibilities among the State and Federal governments.”69 
Sometimes, this finding was accompanied by a statement that the rule did 
not impose substantial costs on states or preempt state law, but frequently 
one or the other (most often, the preemption analysis) was not addressed 
                                                                                                                                      
65 Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State 
Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,700, 11,714–15 (Feb. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 155); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Amendments to the 
HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,541, 
15,550 (Mar. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 153, 156). 
66 Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 
2010, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,144, 17,202 (Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R pts. 
431, 435, 437). 
67 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Standards Related to Essential 
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,864 
(Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156). 
68 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers; Final 
Rule and Interim Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,443–44 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–57). 
69 Id. 
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one way or another.  On two instances, the rules only addressed the 
preemption analysis and ignored the other two prongs.  
Notably, the federal government more frequently acknowledged 
the preemptive effects and costs of rules that were issued later in the 
implementation process.  In at least some cases, these later rules found such 
implications even though earlier rules on the same topics had not.70 For 
example, while the 2012 final rule on standards related to reinsurance, risk 
corridors, and risk adjustment (collectively referred to as “premium 
stabilization programs”) did not include any discussion of federalism,71 the 
Federalism Impact Statement in the October 2013 final rule on these 
programs found that the rule would impose direct costs on states as “State-
operated reinsurance and risk adjustment programs are required to 
undertake oversight, record maintenance and reporting activities.”72 
Similarly, while the March 2012 rule on exchange establishment included 
standards for navigator programs,73 the potential preemptive effect of these 
rules was not discussed until subsequent rulemaking in July 2013 and May 
2014.74 
 
                                                                                                                                      
70 The statements, however, were largely consistent from proposed to final 
rules, in contrast to earlier research documenting that agencies often only 
acknowledged any preemptive effects in final rather than proposed rules. Sharkey, 
supra note 32, at 2139. 
71 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to 
Reinsurance, Risk Corridors and Risk Adjustment, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,220 (Mar. 23, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153). 
72 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange, 
Premium Stabilization Programs, and Market Standards; Amendments to the HHS 
Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,046, 65,091 
(Oct. 30, 2013) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147). 
73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers; Final Rule and 
Interim Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,330–34, 18,443 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156, 157). 
74 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions: Standards 
for Navigators and Non-Navigator Assistance Personnel; Consumer Assistance 
Tools and Programs of an Exchange and Certified Application Counselors; Final 
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,824, 42,858–59 (July 17, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 155); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange and Insurance 
Market Standards for 2015 and Beyond; Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 30240, 30,333–
35 (May 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147). 
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3. State Participation in Notice-and-Comment 
Rulemaking 
 
In the case of exchange implementation, many states were in fact 
fairly active in the commenting process.75 Discounting five rules or notices 
for which no states submitted comments,76 an average of between thirteen 
and fourteen states submitted either individual or joint comments on each 
exchange-related action.  This, however, glosses over significant variability 
across solicitations. 
The action on which the greatest number of states (forty-one, 
including the District of Columbia) submitted comments was a proposed 
rule titled, “Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 
Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal Processes for Medicaid and 
Exchange Eligibility Appeals and Other Provisions Related to Eligibility 
and Enrollment for Exchanges, Medicaid and CHIP, and Medicaid 
Premiums and Cost Sharing.”77 As indicated by the name, this was an 
“omnibus” rule covering a wide range of issues and it elicited comments 
from a number of state agencies or offices that did not normally participate 
in the exchange rulemaking process, such as administrative hearing 
                                                                                                                                      
75 See infra App. B. 
76 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,380 (May 
23, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Amendments to the HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment 
Parameters for 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,541 (Mar. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pts. 153, 156); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Establishment 
of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health Options 
Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,553 (proposed Mar. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pts. 155, 156); Health Insurance Exchanges; Application by the 
Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC) To Be a 
Recognized Accrediting Entity for the Accreditation of Qualified Health Plans, 78 
Fed. Reg. 56,711 (Sept. 13, 2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
Maximizing January 1, 2014 Coverage Opportunities, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,212 (Dec. 
17, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156). 
77 Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges: Essential 
Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and 
Appeal Processes for Medicaid and Exchange Eligibility Appeals and Other 
Provisions Related to Eligibility and Enrollment for Exchanges, Medicaid and 
CHIP, and Medicaid Premiums and Cost Sharing; 78 Fed. Reg. 4,594 (proposed 
Jan. 22, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 433, 435, 440, 447, 457, 
45 C.F.R. pt. 155). 
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offices.78 Other highly commented on rules included the initial exchange 
establishment proposed rule79 (thirty-five states, including the District of 
Columbia) and the Medicaid eligibility proposed rule80 (thirty-eight states, 
including the District of Columbia) (which states sometimes responded to 
with a single set of joint comments81), and the recent proposed rule 
Exchange and Insurance Market Standards for 2015 and Beyond82 (twenty-
five states, including the District of Columbia).  Twenty states responded to 
the initial request for comments on exchanges,83 which as discussed above, 
was largely targeted towards soliciting state-specific responses.  Curiously, 
only six states responded to the proposed rule on the application, review, 
and reporting process for state innovation waivers.84 
                                                                                                                                      
78 See, e.g., Comments of the D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings on Proposed 45 
CFR Part 155, Subpart F (Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2013-0012-0511; Comments of Michael Zimmer, 
Exec. Dir., Mich. Admin. Hearings Sys., on Proposed 42 CFR Parts 430, 431, 433, 
435, 440, 447, and 457, and 45 CFR Part 155 (Feb. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2013-0012-0397; 
Comments of Tracy L. Henry, Chief A.L.J., Penn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Bureau 
of Hearings & Appeals (BHA) on Proposed Rule on Medicaid, CHIP and 
Exchanges (Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document 
Detail;D=CMS-2013-0012-0522. 
79 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156). 
80  Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 
2010, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,148 (proposed Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 431, 433, 435, 457). 
81 See, e.g., The State of Utah’s Comments on Proposed Federal Rules 
Relating to the Implementation of Exchanges Under the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 
31, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HHS-OS-
2011-0020-2287 (responding to five distinct proposed rules issued between July 15 
and Aug. 17, 2011). 
82 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange and Insurance Market 
Standards for 2015 and Beyond; Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,808 (proposed Mar. 
21, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 146, 147, 149, 153, 155, 156, 158). 
83 Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges; Request for 
Comments Regarding Exchange-Related Provisions in Title I of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,584 (Aug. 3, 2010) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170). 
84 Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 
75 Fed. Reg. 13,553 (proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 155). 
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Based on their response rates, this Article classifies twenty-one states 
as “infrequent participants” in rulemaking, submitting comments four or 
fewer times (Table 3).  Of these, only one state (Delaware) did not respond to 
any solicitations, however.  Sixteen states and the District of Columbia may 
be classified as “moderate participants,” responding to between five and nine 
solicitations, while thirteen states may be classified as “frequent participants,” 
responding to ten or more solicitations.  Unsurprisingly, states operating state-
based exchanges (New York and Oregon) were the most frequent 
commenters, responding to sixteen and fifteen solicitations, respectively.  An 
additional six states operating state-based exchanges—California (fourteen), 
Colorado (eleven), Maryland (eleven), Massachusetts (twelve), Minnesota 
(twelve), and Washington (twelve)—commented on ten or more publications.  
Utah, which is operating its own state-based small business exchange, also 
commented on ten actions.  Perhaps more surprisingly, some states that opted 
to defer to take no part in exchange operation were also actively engaged 
throughout the notice-and-comment process, including Louisiana (eleven), 
Oklahoma (eleven), Tennessee (ten), and Wisconsin (eleven).  In addition, 
some states that either operated their own exchanges or formally partnered 
with the federal government largely opted out of formal commenting process, 
including Delaware (zero), Hawaii (two), Idaho (four), Kentucky (two), and 
New Hampshire (three). 
 
Table 3. State Responses to Federal Exchange Solicitations 
 State (Frequency of Participation) 
Frequent 
Commenter 
CA (14x), CO (11x), LA (11x), MD (11x), MA (12x), MN 
(12x), NY (16x), OK (11x), OR (15x), TN (10x), UT (10x), 
WA (12x), WI (11x) 
Moderate 
Commenter 
AL (7x), AZ (7x), AR (6x), DC (7x), IL (6x), IN (7x), IA 
(5x), ME (6x), MI (8x), NE (5x), NV (9x), NM (6x), OH 
(7x), RI (6x), TX (8x), VT (6x), WV (5x) 
Infrequent 
Commenter 
AK (3x), CT (3x), DE (0x), FL (2x), GA (4x), HI (2x), ID 
(4x), KS (4x), KY (2x), MS (2x), MO (2x), MT (1x), NH 
(3x), NJ (4x), NC (2x), ND (3x), PA (3x), SC (2x), SD (4x), 
VA (2x), WY (1x) 
State-Based Exchange  
State Partnership Exchange 
Federally Facilitated Exchange (including Marketplace Plan Management States) 
Bifurcated Exchange 
 
In interviews, officials from states that were moderate or frequent 
commenters noted that they primarily submitted comments to establish a 
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formal record of their opinion.85 State officials doubted, however, that the 
commenting would be enough to change an outcome on its own.86 One 
official from a state with a federally run exchange appraised things by 
noting that, “[o]ur comments are lumped in with hundreds, if not 
thousands, of others, so it is probably not the most effective way of 
influencing the process, but it is one way and we certainly took advantage 
of that avenue.”87 Some state officials noted that they would often rely on 
the NAIC to represent their interests—as one related, “I think they pay 
attention to NAIC.  From individual states, it depends on what they’re 
saying.”88 Capacity also presented a barrier to commenting for some states: 
“it was all we could do to operationalize our exchange and keep up with the 
federal rules as best we could . . . .  We didn’t have time to be concerned 
about providing comments.”89 
 State officials quickly pivoted from discussion of their approach to 
rulemaking to the other avenues they used to weigh in and often found to 
be more effective direct interaction with federal officials, whether over the 
                                                                                                                                      
85 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
86 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 11, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity 
and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run health 
insurance exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); 
Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (May 
2, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). But see Interview with 
senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld) (“[T]hey would seriously consider 
our comments and they would take the comments whenever they could.”); 
Interview with senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld) (“[T]he comments are taken very seriously by the 
feds. . . . Unless something goes in in formal comments it doesn’t get counted.”). 
87 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
88 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
89 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange 
(Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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phone, in person, or by email.90 A former federal official echoed their 
sentiments: “The comments are important, and we would always ask for 
thoughts in writing. But the more interactive process was more 
important.”91 A formal comment letter from Tennessee on the initial health 
insurance premium tax credit proposed rule reflects the idea that the direct 
interactions are where the action is as well as states’ interest in establishing 
a formal record of those interactions.92 Specifically, regulators included 
copies of letters and email communications sent between state and federal 
officials regarding, among other things, negotiations over whether and how 
to allow Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) to offer products 
on exchanges.93 Putting these conversations in the formal public record 
may be seen as a way to hold federal officials accountable to their off-the-
record commitments. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
90 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity 
and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run health 
insurance exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); 
Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 
18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior 
official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run 
health insurance exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation 
withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 21, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
91 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
92 Darin J. Gordon, TennCare Dir. & Deputy Comm’r, Div. of Health Care 
Fin. & Admin., State of Tennessee’s Comments on Proposed Rules about 
Eligibility for Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Subsidies (Oct. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2011-0024-
0072. 
93 Id. at 14, 16–17, 19–32. 
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B. INFORMAL ENGAGEMENT: DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
COMMUNICATION 
 
In this section, the Article discusses additional channels used by 
states to informally influence federal decisions on exchange 
implementation.  Direct communication between state and federal 
officials—in person, over the phone, and by email—was common and 
valued by state officials.  Some states also chose to bring in third parties, 
including members of Congress and the media, to pressure the federal 
government when state officials felt they were not making headway.  In 
some cases, states were also able to take advantage of their first-mover 
status: having acted on an issue before the federal government had finalized 
its decision-making, states were able to ensure that any subsequent federal 
action accommodated their preferences. 
 
1. Direct Communication 
 
On July 29, 2010, the first allotment of federal grant funding for 
the planning and establishment of exchanges (known as “section 1311 
funds”) was opened to states.94 According to a former federal official, HHS 
began holding forums with state officials shortly thereafter.95  Every state, 
except Alaska, subsequently applied for, at least some, exchange grant 
funding,96 and the grant application and monitoring process has provided a 
critical opportunity for state-federal interaction.  Before each grant cycle, 
states could participate in pre-application conference calls, during which 
federal officials would provide information about the project and offer 
policy and budgetary guidance.97 Grant recipients were assigned a state 
                                                                                                                                      
94 OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., STATE PLANNING AND ESTABLISHMENT GRANTS FOR THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S EXCHANGES (July 29, 2010), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Funding-Opportunities/Downloads/ 
exchange_planning_grant_foa.pdf. 
95 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
96 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Creating a New Competitive 
Health Insurance Marketplace, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/ 
Marketplace-Grants/index.html (last visited May 22, 2015). 
97 See, e.g., OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT 
ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE-OPERATED HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 13–14 
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officer to track their progress and provide technical assistance as needed,98 
and CCIIO held at least two multi-day meetings in Washington, D.C. with 
grantees during which federal officials would review policy and operational 
issues.99  
State officials from both states operating state-based exchanges and 
states with partnership and fully federally run exchanges reported that their 
state officers became their primary contact point at HHS.100 Depending on 
the proximity to the initial open enrollment period beginning in October 
2013, state officials would be interacting with their state officer on a daily 
or weekly basis.101 As needed, state officers would funnel questions or 
                                                                                                                                      
(Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Funding-
Opportunities/Downloads/foa_exchange_establishment.pdf. 
98 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 43 (Dec. 6, 
2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/FundingOpportunities/ 
Downloads/amended-spring-2012-establishment-foa.pdf. 
99 See, e.g., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Affordable Insurance 
Exchanges: State Exchange Grantee Meeting: September 19–20, 2011, CMS.GOV, 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Presentations/hie-fall-2011-grantee-
meeting.html (last visited May 22, 2015); Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. 
Oversight, Affordable Insurance Exchanges: System-Wide Exchange Meeting: May 
21–23, 2012, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Presentations/hie-
spring-2012-conference.html (last visited May 22, 2015). 
100 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (March 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity 
and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run health 
insurance exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); 
Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 
20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior 
official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 25, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run 
health insurance exchange state (Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld). 
101 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity 
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concerns to policy and legal staff within CCIIO, CMS, or IRS, or set up 
calls so they could directly communicate with states.102 One state official 
also noted that their state officer would tip them off on when to escalate an 
issue to a higher level because they were not getting traction.103 
As implementation moved forward, higher-level officials at CCIIO 
and CMS would also hold regular calls with state officials, including 
weekly meetings with the directors of state-based exchanges.104 The federal 
government also continued to hold or attend multi-state meetings where 
states could schedule “office hours” visits with federal officials to discuss 
different policy options.105 According to one state official, “states that 
wanted to be involved took advantage [of these meetings].  We wanted to 
interact with HHS as much as we could.”106 
State officials indicated that the informal nature of these 
interactions was valuable, particularly with respect to operational 
questions.  According to one official, “it is much easier to talk about things 
informally rather than put in writing that you can’t complete a legal 
requirement . . . CMS played an important advisory role and problem 
solving role that wouldn’t have been possible through formal rules.”107 
Another official noted that they appreciated the ability to form a close 
                                                                                                                                      
and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run health 
insurance exchange state (May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation 
withheld). 
102 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 25, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity 
and affiliation withheld). 
103 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
104 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
former federal official (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation 
withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
105 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
106 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
107 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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relationship with their federal partners and engage in dialogue about issues 
rather than just submitting written comments.108  
The informal nature of communications also drew concern from 
states, however.  In particular, states felt that they did not always hear from 
the federal government about policy decisions when they felt they should 
have.  For example, one official from a state with a partnership exchange 
noted that they first learned through the New York Times that the federal 
government was going to delay implementing employee choice (a 
functionality whereby a single employer can allow their employees to 
choose from multiple different health plans offered by different insurers) in 
federally run small business exchanges.109 The delays resulted, in part, from 
the rulemaking process itself, as federal staff was barred from answering 
questions while they were drafting rules.110 At most, states might have 
learned the gist of a rule a few hours before it was released.111 Other times, 
state officials felt the delays were more strategic: “The press was hungry to 
point out any flaws.  That created some hesitancy on the part of the feds to 
share things with the states.”112 For example, state officials reported not 
getting advance notice before the administration announced that it was 
adopting a transitional policy whereby health insurers could continue to 
renew policies that do not meet the ACA’s requirements beyond January 1, 
2014,113 and that it would be changing the coverage effective date for plans 
purchased through the federally facilitated exchange between December 
15th and 23rd and that it encouraged state-based exchanges to do the 
                                                                                                                                      
108 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
109 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
110 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld).  
111 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld).  
112 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
113 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). The policy was 
announced in a public letter to insurance commissioners released on November 14, 
2013. Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to 
Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf. 
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same.114 Many state officials also commented that their primary contacts 
were not always kept up to date on policy or operational changes.115  
State officials also perceived that the federal government was 
reluctant to put anything in writing due to political pressure, and reported 
getting different answers to the same questions from one week to the next 
as different people would join their discussions: “It was hard to get real 
consistent answers.”116 One state official expressed particular frustration 
that they were never allowed to speak to the HHS Office of the General 
Counsel (OGC), describing OGC as a “mysterious entity, like the Wizard 
of Oz.”117 Messages would be channeled between intermediaries who did 
not necessarily have legal expertise or an understanding of health 
insurance, opening the door for miscommunications and 
misunderstanding.118  
                                                                                                                                      
114 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). This 
policy was announced in a fact sheet released on December 12, 2013. Taking Steps 
to Smooth Consumers' Transition into Health Coverage Through the Marketplace, 
CMS.GOV (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaRelease 
Database/Fact-sheets/2013-Fact-sheets-items/2013-12-12.html. This proposal was 
published in interim final rule five days later. Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act; Maximizing January 1, 2014 Coverage Opportunities, 78 Fed. Reg. 
76,212 (Dec. 17, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156).  
115 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
116 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Marc. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); see also, e.g., 
Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 
18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior 
official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run 
health insurance exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation 
withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
117 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
118 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). This frustration 
particularly arose with respect to questions regarding sub-regulatory guidance, 
which, unlike rules issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, are not 
required to cite the legal authority under which they are being issued. See William 
Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2001) 
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2. Indirect Communication  
 
State officials offered differing opinions on the value of using third 
parties, including members of Congress and the press, to influence federal 
decision-making.  In some cases, state officials implied that going to the 
press or other third parties would be a breach of the trust and bonds they 
had with federal officials.  According to one official from a state with a 
federally run exchange, “[o]ur feeling was that we can [sic] take care of our 
own issues. We had established relationships not only with our project 
officer but other people within CCIIO . . . .  If I needed to, I would elevate 
issues up to [the senior staff level].”119 Another framed it politically, “[o]ur 
governor wants to support the Obama Administration and exchange 
implementation.  There have been times when we could have gone out of 
our way to point out problems, and we haven’t done that.”120 Others simply 
rejected the option as unnecessary121 or expressed concern that it would not 
benefit them to go to the press.122 
 States appeared more willing to use their congressional delegation 
to escalate an issue than the press.123 One official characterized this as a 
“more muted” option than going public with concerns.124 However, this 
option was only available to the extent state officials perceived their 
                                                                                                                                      
(“These rules . . . are not ‘law’ in the way that statutes and substantive rules that 
have gone through notice and comment are ‘law,’ in the sense of creating legal 
obligations on private parties.”).  
119 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
120 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
121 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
122 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
123 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 11, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state 
with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld). 
124 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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congressional delegation to be supportive of their requests, which was not 
the case in every state.125 
Among states that were more willing to use third parties, most 
reported only doing so as a last resort.  According to a state-based 
exchange official, “[i]t’s a stronger option that we only turn to if no 
movement and it’s not needed very often.  But there have been times when 
they’ve been involved.”126 Some states would be willing to pull the trigger 
more quickly than others, though.  As one official from a state with a state 
partnership exchange reported, “[a]ny time we had a problem, we felt like 
we could go to [our Senator].  And we did.  And we felt we could use the 
press if we were having trouble . . . .  If there wasn’t communications [sic] 
with us, we’d make it known.”127 
 
C. THE ROLE OF THE STATE INTEREST GROUPS AND CROSS-
STATE COLLABORATION 
 
 The NAIC played a particularly active role in exchange 
implementation.  Congress recognized the potential value of NAIC (self-
described as, “the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support organization 
created and governed by the chief insurance regulators from the 50 states, 
the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories”128) in the ACA.  The 
statute calls on the Secretary of HHS to consult with NAIC on numerous 
occasions,129 including multiple provisions closely to exchange 
implementation.130 HHS has since not merely consulted with NAIC, but in 
                                                                                                                                      
125 Compare Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance 
exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld) 
(noting supportive relationship), with Interview with senior official, federally run 
health insurance exchange state (Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld) (noting unsupportive relationship). 
126 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
127 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
128 Senator Ben Nelson, About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited May 22, 2015). 
129 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1333(a)(1), 
1341(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 18053(a)(1), 18061(b)(1) (2012). 
130 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311(c)(1)(F), 
1321(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(c)(1)(F), 18041(a)(2) (2012). 
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fact relied on it to write first drafts of key regulations131 and templates of a 
uniform summary of benefits and coverage.132  
Particularly early on, before it had developed relationships with 
individual states, the federal government relied on state interest groups to 
convey messages to and from the states.133 HHS acknowledged this 
important convening role of state interest groups early on when it sent a 
letter to the presidents of NAIC, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), and the National Governors Association (NGA) 
accompanying its first guidance document on exchanges.134 The letter 
states:  
 
As we look ahead to the establishment of the Exchanges 
and other reforms, it is essential that we work closely with 
states every step of the way. 
 
The enclosed guidance is another sign of our commitment 
to provide states with timely, useful information and 
assistance in response to the priorities and needs states 
have communicated to us.  It provides transparency in our 
efforts and offers states interested in acting in the corning 
year input into the structure and function of Exchanges.135 
 
The letter also acknowledges NAIC’s work to draft model exchange 
legislation, adding that the “preliminary drafts currently under review are in 
                                                                                                                                      
131 Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 
534, 563–64 (2011) (noting that HHS adopted NAIC's draft medical loss ratio 
regulations). 
132 Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, New Rules for Summaries of Health 
Benefits and Coverage, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=55f86fb0-247e-4ff4-87b5-884aba08f4b6. 
133 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
134 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to 
Christine Gregoire, Governor of Wash., Jane L. Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Ins. Comm’rs, and Senator Richard T. Moore (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/exchange_guidance_cove
r_letter_101118.pdf (regarding initial guidance on Health Insurance Exchanges). 
135 Id. at 1. 
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accordance with the statute and will serve as a helpful model for states to 
establish authorizing legislation for their Exchanges.”136 
 Since then, all three organizations have been active in exchange-
related activities.  NCSL and NAIC were moderate to frequent participants 
in notice-and-comment rulemaking,137 and NAIC, as well as NGA, has sent 
public letters to HHS, the White House, and members of Congress outside 
of commenting periods to emphasize points of concerns.138 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                      
136 Id. at 2. 
137 See, e.g., Letter from Susan E. Voss, Iowa Ins. Comm’r & President, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Kevin M. McCarty, Fla. Ins. Comm’r & President-Elect, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, James J. Donelon, La. Ins. Comm’r & Vice 
President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and Adam Hamm, N.D. Ins. Comm’r & 
Sec’y-Treasurer, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, on behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n. of Ins. 
Comm’rs, to Donald Berwick, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Oct. 
5, 2011), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_ 
111005_naic_letter_centers_medicare_medicaid_services2.pdf; see also Special 
Section: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act & State Insurance 
Regulation, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/index_health 
_reform_section.htm (last visited May 22, 2015). Additional comment letters 
include NCSL on the Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges; 
Request for Comments Regarding Exchange-Related Provisions in Title I of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (OCIIO–9989–NC); Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans Proposed Rule (CMS–9989–P); Medicaid 
Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010 Final and 
Interim Final Rules (CMS–2349–F); and Standards Related to Essential Health 
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation Proposed Rule (CMS–9980–P). 
Letters are available by searching the respective file code (in parentheses) on 
ncsl.org. 
138 See, e.g., Letter from Terry Branstad, Governor of Iowa & Chair, Health & 
Human Servs. Comm., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, and Pat Quinn, Governor of Ill. & 
Vice Chair, Health & Human Servs. Comm., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, on behalf of 
the Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-
relations/nga-letters/health--human-services-committee/col2-content/main-content-
list/november-2-2011-letter---health.html; Letter from Susan E. Voss, Iowa Ins. 
Comm’r & President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Kevin M. McCarty, Fla. Ins. 
Comm’r & President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, James J. Donelon, La. 
Ins. Comm’r & Vice President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and Adam Hamm, 
N.D. Ins. Comm’r & Sec’y-Treasurer, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, on behalf of 
the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. (Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index 
_health_reform_111107_naic_letter_sec_sebeilus_exchange_partner_guide.pdf; 
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groups have convened numerous in-person meetings and calls where states 
can meet with each other and with federal officials.  For example, in 2011, 
NGA hosted a two-day meeting entitled, “Timelines, State Options, and 
Federal Regulations,” that was attended by more than 120 state officials 
and ended with a group meeting with federal officials from HHS and the 
Department of Treasury on exchange implementation.139 A year later, NGA 
again convened a two-day meeting at which participants compiled a 
lengthy list of questions for federal officials on exchanges and Medicaid 
                                                                                                                                      
Letter from James J. Donelon, La. Ins. Comm’r & President, Nat’n Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, Adam Hamm, N.D. Ins. Comm’r & President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, Monica J. Lindeen, Mont. Comm’r of Sec. & Ins. & Vice President, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and Michael F. Consedine, Pa. Ins. Comm’r & 
Sec’y-Treasurer, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, on behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Harry Reid, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of 
Representatives, and Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate,  (Nov. 6, 
2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_ 
comments_131106_naic_letter_to_congress_aca_implementation.pdf; Letter from 
Adam Hamm, N.D. Ins. Comm’r & President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, 
Monica J. Lindeen, Mont. Comm’r of Sec. & Ins. & President-Elect, Nat’n Ass’n 
of Ins. Comm’rs, Michael F. Consedine, Pa. Ins. Comm’r & Vice President, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r & Sec’y-Treasurer, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, on behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to Dr. 
Mandy Cohen, Interim Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight (Apr. 23, 
2014), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_ 
comments_140423_naic_letter_cciio_network_adequacy.pdf; Letter from Adam 
Hamm, N.D. Ins. Comm’r & President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Monica J. 
Lindeen, Mont. Comm’r of Sec. & Ins. & President-Elect, Nat’n Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, Michael F. Consedine, Pa. Ins. Comm’r & Vice President, Nat’l Ass’n 
of Ins. Comm’rs, Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r & Sec’y-Treasurer, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, and Senator E. Benjamin Nelson, Chief Exec. Officer, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, on behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to 
President Barack Obama (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/index_health_reform_comments_140501_naic_letter_wh_followup_let
ter.pdf. 
139 KRISTA DROBAC, NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES ISSUE BRIEF: STATE 
PERSPECTIVES ON INSURANCE EXCHANGES: IMPLEMENTING HEALTH REFORM IN AN 
UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1109NGAEXCHANGESSUMM
ARY.PDF. 
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expansion.140 Federal officials also regularly attend NAIC’s bi-annual 
conferences.141  
All three organizations have also published materials to assist 
states.  NAIC’s efforts are particularly noteworthy and include a model law 
on exchange establishment;142 a chart of federal ACA FAQs;143 summaries 
of clear or potential preemptions on state authority with respect to qualified 
health plans and health plans sold outside exchanges;144 a summary of 
decisions to be made by states with a federally run exchange;145 and white 
papers on topics including accreditation and quality,146 marketing and 
                                                                                                                                      
140 NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, HEALTH CARE: DECISION POINTS FOR STATES 
MEETING SUMMARY (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/ 
sites/NGA/files/pdf/HealthCareDecisionPointsforStates.pdf. An appendix with the 
full list of questions from states is available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/ 
sites/NGA/files/pdf/AppendixQuestionsfromStates.pdf. 
141 See, e.g., Health Insurance Exchanges Focus of Governors Session, NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N (July 16, 2011), http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-
room/news-releases/page_2011/col2-content/main-content-list/health-insurance-
exchanges-focus.html; Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, 2014 NAIC Spring National 
Meeting Final Registration List; Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, 2013 NAIC Fall 
National Meting Final Registration List.  
142 AM. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCH. MODEL ACT (2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_exchanges_adopted_health_benefit
_exchanges.pdf.  
143 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ALL ACA-RELATED FEDERAL FAQS AS OF 
OCTOBER 9, 2013, available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health 
_reform _faq.pdf.  
144 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACA IMPACT ON STATE REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY: QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_130627_preemption_analysis_qhp.
pdf; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACA IMPACT ON STATE REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY: HEALTH PLANS OUTSIDE EXCHANGES (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_130627_preemption_analysis_outsi
de_market.pdf. 
145 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE DECISIONS: FEDERALLY 
FACILITATED EXCHANGE (FFE) STATES (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.naic.org/ documents/committees_b_130627_ffe_state_decisions.pdf.  
146 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, EXCHANGES PLAN MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTION: ACCREDITATION AND QUALITY WHITE PAPER  (2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_accred_quality.pdf. 
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consumer assistance,147 and network adequacy.148 In addition, NCSL has 
maintained up-to-date resources on state action on exchanges149 and NGA 
has published issue briefs on exchange implementation.150 State officials 
expressed particular gratitude for their help interpreting the sea of 
regulations and guidance coming out of the federal government.151 
 More recently, a fourth state interest group comprised specifically 
of state exchange directors and staff has formed.  The State Health 
Exchange Leadership Network, also known informally as “Exchangers,” is 
convened by the National Academy of State Health Policy (NASHP).152 It 
is led by an eleven-person steering committee of state and exchange 
officials representing all exchange models,153 and currently has over 400 
members representing all fifty states and the District of Columbia.154 
                                                                                                                                      
147 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKETING AND CONSUMER 
INFORMATION WHITE PAPER: NAVIGATORS, AGENTS AND BROKERS, MARKETING 
AND SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COVERAGE (2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_marketing_consumer_i
nfo.pdf.  
148 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, PLAN MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: 
NETWORK ADEQUACY WHITE PAPER (2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_network_adequacy.pdf.   
149 Richard Cauchi, State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-
benefit.aspx. 
150 See, e.g., TOM DEHNER, NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES ISSUE BRIEF: 
STATE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND CHILDREN’S COVERAGE: ISSUES FOR 
STATE DESIGN DECISIONS (Aug. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1108CHILDRENHEALTHEXC
HANGES.PDF. 
151 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
152 NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, STATE HEALTH EXCHANGE 
LEADERSHIP NETWORK: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014), 
http://nashp.org/sites/default/files/Exchangers_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
153 As of April 2014, Steering Committee Members represented the following 
states: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. Nat’l Acad. for State Health 
Pol’y, State Health Exchange Leadership Network: Steering Committee 
Membership (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/ 
files/Steering_Commitee_membership_list_4-2014.pdf.  
154 NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 152, at 4–5. 
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Unlike NAIC, NCSL, and NGA, the “Exchangers” is not formed as an 
association and does not conduct official lobbying itself.155 It does, 
however, facilitate regular calls between state exchange directors and staff 
and online information sharing between states,156 and is currently building 
relationships with federal officials.157 One state official noted that this 
group filled an important gap, as much of exchange implementation, such 
as building call centers and eligibility systems, fell beyond the scope of the 
existing groups’ expertise.158  
Outside of these formal networks, collaboration between states in 
terms of advocating the federal government appears to have been irregular 
(information sharing, in contrast, was much more common).  On only three 
instances did states come together to submit multi-state comment letters in 
response to formal notice-and-comment rulemaking independent of the 
NAIC, NGA, or NCSL,159 and, in interviews, state officials often reported 
that they did not typically band together for lobbying purposes.  There were 
some exceptions, however.  For example, an official from a state with a 
partnership exchange noted that they coordinated with other states to 
successfully discourage CCIIO from requiring partnership states from 
entering into formal memoranda of understanding (MOUs).160 In addition, 
officials reported that a handful of states defaulting to federally run 
                                                                                                                                      
155 Interview with senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
156 NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 152, at 4. 
157 Interview with senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
158 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
159 Pam Bondi, Fla. Attorney Gen., et al., Comments from the States of 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia on Consumer Protection Issues Raised by 
HHS’s Proposed Rule (CMS-9949-P) (Apr. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2014-0036-0163 
(including comments on consumer protection issues raised by HHS’s proposed 
rule); Caroline M. Brown & Philip J. Peisch, Joint Comments on Behalf of Nine 
States and State Agencies Regarding Proposed Rules for Alternative Benefit Plans 
(Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; 
D=CMS-2013-0012-0453; Gordon, supra note 92 (reprinting a letter to federal 
officials from officials from Arizona, Tennessee, and Utah). 
160 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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exchanges joined forces to ensure they could maintain authority over the 
regulation of qualified health plans. Their collective advocacy ultimately 
resulted in the creation of the “marketplace plan management option” by 
which states could conduct plan management on behalf of the federally run 
exchange, which seven states—Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Virginia—ultimately took part in for 2014.161  
According to one participant in the group: “It worked out really well for us. 
At some point HHS acknowledged that there was this core group of states 
[that wanted to be engaged in exchange implementation] and started 
reaching out to us collectively.”162 
 
IV. FACTORS AFFECTING STATE INFLUENCE OVER 
FEDERAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
Objectively assessing how much influence state officials ultimately 
had over exchange implementation is difficult.163 Rather than attempt to 
tally victories and losses and speculate over whether a state’s input, versus 
other factors, drove any given decision, this Part more broadly identifies 
four factors that appear to have affected how much influence states were 
able to hold over federal decision-making.  These factors include the extent 
to which the federal government perceived states to share their goals for 
ACA implementation, limits on federal resources and capacity for 
exchange implementation, institutional characteristics of the different 
federal agencies involved and their relevant sub-components, and the 
ability of states to take “first-mover” advantage. 
Prior to proceeding, however, it is worth noting that while the 
federal government appeared to put more effort into conducting federalism 
impact analyses than research has found it to in the past, it appears to be a 
largely pro forma practice.  It seems unlikely that the inclusion of 
federalism impact statements served any public notice function as states 
were closely monitoring the rulemaking process and were aware that the 
rules, whether acknowledged by the federal government or not, would 
                                                                                                                                      
161 DASH ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
162 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
163 Seifter, supra note 11, at 473–74 (“Empirical studies [of state influence 
over federal agency decision-making] are scarce, and measuring regulatory 
influence in any context is notoriously difficult.” (footnote omitted)). 
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directly impact their interests.  In fact, rather than rely on the federal 
government’s federalism analysis, states turned to the NAIC to conduct a 
comprehensive preemption review.164 In addition, while it is possible that 
federal officials were inspired to conduct additional outreach to states 
and/or revise their decisions in light of Executive Order 13,132, there was 
no suggestion that this was in fact the case.  Any increase in attentiveness 
to state interests may be just as readily explained by the previously 
mentioned command in the ACA that the Secretary of HHS consults with 
state insurance regulators.165 
 
A. STATE INTERESTS AND THE COMPETING GOALS OF THE ACA 
 
 The ACA embodies multiple and sometimes competing goals. 
Broadly speaking, one of its primary purposes is to reduce the number of 
people who are uninsured by promoting access to more affordable coverage 
through Medicaid expansion, financial support for low-to-moderate income 
families purchasing private coverage, and reforming the private health 
insurance market so companies can no longer deny coverage to those who 
need it.166 The law is also intended to strengthen consumer rights and 
protections for people who are already or become insured.167 At the same 
time, Congress specifically rejected a national model for exchange 
implementation in favor of the state-led approach.168 Thus, while the 
                                                                                                                                      
164 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACA IMPACT ON STATE REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY: HEALTH PLANS OUTSIDE EXCHANGES, supra note 144; NAT’L ASS’N 
OF INS. COMM’RS, ACA IMPACT ON STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY: QUALIFIED 
HEALTH PLANS, supra note 144.  
165 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(a), 42 U.S.C. § 
18041(a) (2012) (establishment of standards for state flexibility in operation and 
enforcement of exchanges and related requirements). 
166 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612–14, 2629 
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 2626 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Recall that one of Congress' 
goals in enacting the Affordable Care Act was to eliminate the insurance industry's 
practice of charging higher prices or denying coverage to individuals with 
preexisting medical conditions.”). 
168 Gluck, supra note 7, at 1757 (“[E]xchange governance was the key 
question that divided the House and Senate versions of the legislation, with the 
Senate invoking ‘federalism’ values to insist on the state-leadership default 
preference that ultimately carried the day.”); see also Metzger, supra note 7, at 576 
(“This reliance on state-run exchanges marks a significant difference between the 
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federal government was asserting new control over an area traditionally 
regulated by the states by setting broad consumer protection rules, it 
continued to value at least some state flexibility.169 As Professor Gillian 
Metzger has commented in light of similar approaches by the Obama 
Administration in other areas of the law, this represents “federalism in 
service of progressive policy, not a general devolution of power and 
resources to the states.”170   
 Indeed, some academics have characterized HHS’s approach to 
implementation as reflecting a “general policy of flexibility toward states’ 
efforts to carry out their obligations under the ACA,”171 or, more strongly, a 
“policy of ‘maximum flexibility’ to the states on a number of the key 
implementation points involving the health exchanges and other 
variables.”172 And, in interviews, officials widely acknowledged that the 
federal government has provided states significant independence in most 
areas.173 However, there appears to be a limit to this flexibility if the federal 
government perceives that state flexibility or accommodation may be 
                                                                                                                                      
Senate bill that became the ACA and the earlier House version. The latter had 
assigned primary responsibility for operating a national uniform exchange to the 
federal government, with states allowed to opt in to operate state-based exchanges 
if they met federal requirements. State officials lobbied strongly for state-based 
exchanges and for states to retain broad regulatory authority over insurance.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
169 Gluck, supra note 131, at 579. (“[T]he ACA's text itself mentions ‘state 
flexibility’ six times in the context of the exchange provisions.”). 
170 Metzger, supra note 7, at 569–70. 
171 Bagenstos, supra note 41, at 230. 
172 Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional 
Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME 
COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 359, 362 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. 
Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013). 
173 See, e.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health 
insurance exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); 
Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 
21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior 
official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run 
health insurance exchange state (Mar. 25, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state interest group (Mar. 25, 
2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, 
state with state-run health insurance exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
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perceived to threaten the ACA’s primary goal of coverage expansion.  As a 
former federal official described: 
 
If you look at the regulation we put out in July 2011 [on 
exchange establishment]—which was mostly about plan 
management and consumer outreach functions of the 
exchange—the watchwords were state flexibility.  We 
almost needed synonyms for flexibility because we used it 
too much. . . . But when the next regulation came out in 
August—on eligibility and enrollment—the watchwords 
were seamless consumer experience and not state 
flexibility.  If anything, it was supposed to be totally 
regimented. Determinations should come out exactly the 
same for consumers answering questions in different states. 
. . . We didn’t want states innovating around determining if 
someone is eligible for a tax credit or not.174 
 
A striking example of this comes from Utah’s negotiations with the 
federal government over which exchange model to pursue.  In December 
2012, Utah Governor Gary Herbert submitted a declaration letter indicating 
interest in pursuing a state-based exchange.175 However, he noted that his 
willingness to move forward was contingent on having “flexibility to stay 
true to Utah principles.”176 Around this time, the Utah small business 
exchange was frequently compared to Massachusetts’ exchange.177 These 
comparisons primarily focused on the two exchanges’ differing approaches 
to plan management: Utah had adopted a take all comers approach to 
insurer participation, while Massachusetts established more stringent 
                                                                                                                                      
174 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
175 Letter from Gary R. Herbert, Governor of Utah, to Kathleen Sebelius, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Dec. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Technical-Implementation-Letters/ 
Downloads/ut-declaration-letter.pdf. 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST., THE 
MASSACHUSETTS AND UTAH HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: LESSONS LEARNED 
(Geo. Univ. Health Pol’y Inst. Ctr. for Children & Families ed., 2011), available at 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Health-reform_ 
exchanges.pdf. 
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standards for which insurers could participate and what they could offer.178 
This, however, was not an issue as the federal exchange rules gave states 
significant leeway in this area,179 and, in fact, the federal government opted 
to pursue an approach that looked more like the Utah model than the 
Massachusetts model for federally run exchanges.180 Instead, the sticking 
point was over whether Utah would administer Medicaid eligibility 
determinations or assessments or offer premium tax credits through the 
exchange.  In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute in February 
2012, Governor Herbert stated:  
 
We want to maintain clear separation between private 
insurance options in our market based exchange and the 
welfare based public programs such as Medicaid.  In order 
to preserve the market-based principles behind Utah’s 
unique exchange, it is critical that the exchange remain 
focused on the core mission of creating competition and 
choice in insurance markets.  Those who are in need 
                                                                                                                                      
178 See, e.g., Sharon Silow-Carroll et al., Health Insurance Exchanges: State 
Roles in Selecting Health Plans and Avoiding Adverse Selection, STATES IN 
ACTION: INNOVATIONS IN STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Commonwealth Fund, New 
York, N.Y.), Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
Newsletters/States-in-Action/2011/Mar/February-March-2011/Feature/ 
Feature.aspx. 
179 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers; Final Rule and 
Interim Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,406 (Mar. 27, 2012) (“As we noted in 
the preamble to the Exchange establishment proposed rule, we believe that an 
Exchange’s certification approach may vary based upon market conditions and the 
needs of consumers in the service area. Accordingly, in this final rule, we offer 
flexibility to Exchanges on several elements of the certification process, including 
the contracting model, so that Exchanges can appropriately adjust to local market 
conditions and consumer needs. An Exchange could adopt its contracting approach 
from a variety of contracting strategies, including an any qualified plan approach, a 
selective contracting model based on predetermined criteria, or direct negotiation 
with all or a subset of QHPs.”). 
180 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-FACILITATED 
EXCHANGES, supra note 61 (“To ensure a robust QHP market in each State where 
an FFE operates, and to promote consumer choice among QHPs, at least in the first 
year HHS intends to certify as a QHP any health plan that meets all certification 
standards.”). 
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should have the opportunity to get assistance, but that 
determination and effort should be done separately.181 
 
The federal government would not accommodate Utah’s requests. 
However, HHS revised its regulations to create a middle ground, allowing 
Utah to continue to operate its small business exchange while the federal 
government stepped in to run the individual market exchange.182 
More generally, a state official from a state-based exchange state 
acknowledged that they were given flexibility “so long as what we are 
doing contributes to the goal of getting as many people enrolled as 
possible, with as few gaps as possible . . . . If we were trying to go the other 
direction, we would have seen more pushback.”183 Officials from states 
with partnership exchanges reported sometimes being constrained even 
though they shared the same goals with the federal government, because 
the flexibility or authority that would apply to them would also apply to 
states that strongly opposed implementation of health insurance 
exchanges.184  
It is important to note that there was not always a clear line 
between states that shared the administration’s goals and those that did not. 
At least some state officials from states defaulting to federally run 
exchanges went out of their way to work with the federal government to 
ensure that implementation went smoothly.  In some cases, this reflects 
divisions within states over the ACA.  One official commented, “[b]ecause 
I do show up at face-to-face meetings and to talk [to federal officials] 
personally, and because the [state insurance] commissioner is trying to 
support health reform, when I call them or send them an email or tell them 
there is a problem with something, it usually gets responded to.”185 Yet, 
                                                                                                                                      
181 Gov. Gary R. Herbert, Remarks at American Enterprise Institute, Utah’s 
Vision for Healthcare Reform (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.utah.gov/ 
governor/docs/Speech-HealthcareSpeechtoAmerican EnterpriseInstitute.pdf. 
182 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange, 
SHOP, and Eligibility Appeals; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,070, 54,075-76 (Aug. 
30, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.100, 155.105, 155.140). 
183 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
184 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
185 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
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another state official found that even though their boss personally disagreed 
with certain things, they were willing to make things work.186 
 
B. FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND CAPACITY 
  
Limitations on federal resources and capacity appeared to play a 
meaningful role in determining if and when the federal government would 
accommodate state preferences.  In interviews, both state and former 
federal officials noted that the federal government did not anticipate that so 
many states would opt out of running their own exchanges.187 One state 
official added that “once there got to be so many [states opting out], federal 
officials were at the mercy of being much more flexible and were willing to 
give as much as they could to any state participating having a dialogue with 
them.”188 Particularly pressing was the difference in financial resources 
available to states versus the federal government.  While states can 
continue to apply for an unlimited amount of section 1311 establishment 
funds through the end of 2014,189 the ACA dedicated no funds to federal 
exchange operations.  Instead, it only appropriated $1 billion to HHS for 
federal administrative expenses related to implementing the ACA writ 
large.190 HHS has been forced to scrape together resources from existing 
appropriations funds, including HHS’s General Departmental Management 
                                                                                                                                      
186 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
187 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (March 18, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with former senior federal official (March 24, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld). 
188 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
189 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(a), 42 U.S.C. §18031(a) 
(2012) (providing assistance to states to establish American Health Benefit 
Exchanges). 
190 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1005, 42 U.S.C. § 
18121 (2012) (“(a) IN GENERAL. There is hereby established a Health Insurance 
Reform Implementation Fund (referred to in this section as the “Fund”) within the 
Department of Health and Human Services to carry out the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and this Act (and the amendments made by such Acts). (b) 
FUNDING. There is appropriated to the Fund, out of any funds in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, $1,000,000,000 for Federal administrative expenses to 
carry out such Act (and the amendments made by such Acts).”). 
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Account, CMS’s Program Management Account, the Prevention and Public 
Health Fund, and HHS’s Nonrecurring Expenses Fund, to support its 
activities.191 In contrast, as of January 2014, more than $4.6 billion in 
federal grant dollars has been awarded to states (with nearly one quarter of 
state grant dollars going to California).192  
The most obvious development coming out of this dynamic has 
been the introduction of novel exchange models.  The idea of a hybrid 
“partnership” model where functionalities would be shared between a state 
and the federal government was first introduced publicly in the July 2011 
proposed rule on exchange establishment in response to state pressure for 
more options.193 Many states, however, bridled at the “partnership” label 
                                                                                                                                      
191 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-601, STATUS OF CMS 
EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH FEDERALLY FACILITATED HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES 1, 12 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655291.pdf. 
192 Total Health Insurance Exchange Grants, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-exchange-grants/ (last visited May 
22, 2015). 
193 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,870 (proposed July 15, 2011) 
(“HHS has pursued various forms of collaboration with the States to facilitate, 
streamline and simplify the establishment of an Exchange in every State. These 
efforts have made it clear that for a variety of reasons including reducing 
redundancy, promoting efficiency, and addressing the tight implementation 
timelines authorized under the Affordable Care Act, States may find it 
advantageous to draw on a combination of their own work plus business services 
developed by other States and the Federal government as they move toward 
certification. Some States have expressed a preference for a flexible State 
partnership model combining State-designed and operated business functions with 
Federally designed and operated business functions. Examples of such shared 
business functions might include eligibility and enrollment, financial management, 
and health plan management systems and services. We note that States have the 
option to operate an exclusively State-based Exchange. HHS is exploring different 
partnership models that would meet the needs of States and Exchanges.”). Over 
time, the federal government elaborated on how responsibilities and authority 
would be divided: while legally, state partnership exchanges would be federally 
facilitated exchanges, states entering into partnerships could conduct plan 
management responsibilities and/or certain consumer assistance functions, 
including operating an in-person assistance program funded by § 1311 exchange 
establishment grants to supplement the statutorily mandated navigator program, 
which could not be supported by such funds. Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. 
& Ins. Oversight, Affordable Insurance Exchanges Guidance: Guidance on the 
State Partnership Exchange (Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
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and the formal application process the federal government required states 
to follow to enter into a partnership.194 In February 2013, the Kansas 
Insurance Commissioner sent a letter to the director of CCIIO explaining 
that while there was “no political support for a partnership arrangement,” 
the state would like approval to perform plan management functions (such 
as certifying that health plans met state and federal statutory and regulatory 
requirements) on behalf of the federally run exchange.195 Five days later, 
CCIIO issued a FAQ allowing for states to conduct plan management so 
long as they submitted a letter from their governor or insurance 
commissioner attesting to their legal authority and operational capacity to 
do so and agreed to participate in a one-day review session with the federal 
government.196 
Over time, the federal government also expanded the scope of 
activities for which states could use exchange establishment and planning 
grants.  For example, in June 2012, guidance generally provided that states 
with federally facilitated exchanges could use funds to support a transition 
to a state-based or state partnership exchange or to cover the costs of state 
activities to establish interfaces with the federal exchange.197 Ten months 
later, the federal government clarified that states with federally run 
exchanges could use section 1311 funds to conduct statewide marketing 
                                                                                                                                      
CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/partnership-guidance-01-03-
2013.pdf. 
194 According to one state official, state insurance regulators stressed to HHS 
that they “cannot use the word partnership. That would immediately turn off our 
governor’s offices.” Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance 
exchange state (Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
195 Letter from Sandy Praeger, Comm’r of Ins., Kan. Ins. Dept., to Gary 
Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Re: Proposal to Perform 
Plan Management Functions for Federally Facilitated Exchange (Feb. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Technical-Implementation-
Letters/Downloads/ks-exchange-letter-2-15-2013.pdf. 
196 Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Frequently Asked 
Questions: State Evaluation of Plan Management Activities of Health Plans and 
Issuers  (Feb. 20, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/ 
Downloads/plan-management-faq-2-20-2013.pdf. 
197 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Exchange Establishment 
Cooperative Agreement Funding FAQs, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/hie-est-grant-faq-06292012.html (last visited 
May 22, 2015). 
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activities to promote the exchange.198 More guidance was provided just a 
few weeks after that, allowing federally run exchange states to use section 
1311 funds for activities including, among other things, participating in 
stakeholder consultations with HHS; compiling and sharing with HHS 
information on state licensure requirements for navigators, agents, and 
brokers; gathering and sharing state-specific content for the federal web 
portal; and conducting other policy analysis and research to support 
exchange operations.199 Similarly, an official from a state with a 
partnership exchange noted that they had originally been told they would 
need to rely on the federal call center, but later they and other states were 
able to get approval to operate their own,200 thus expanding state 
responsibilities to take pressure off the federal government.  
Resource limitations at the federal level did not always lend itself 
towards increased flexibility for states, however.  To the extent certain 
functions stayed within the federal government, limited resources and 
capacity necessitated greater uniformity—a “one-size-fits-all” model.201 As 
one state official noted, “CMS was supposed to head implementation in the 
states, but became the implementation body for the nation . . . . It’s hard 
working with three or four different states, let alone thirty-six with different 
interests.”202 Another informant felt that the federal government had the 
“attitude that if they were running the exchange for states, the states would 
                                                                                                                                      
198 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Using Section 1311(a) Funding 
for Marketing Activities in a Plan Management State Partnership Marketplace or 
Federally-facilitated Marketplace FAQs, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/marketplace-funding-marketing-faq.html (last 
visited May 22, 2015). 
199 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Frequently Asked Questions on 
Allowable Uses of Section 1311 Funding for States in a State Partnership 
Marketplace or in States with a Federally-Facilitated Marketplace, CMS.GOV, 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/spm-ffm-
funding.html (last visited May 22, 2015). 
200 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
201 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
202 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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need to take it.  CCIIO didn’t have the resources or staff” to provide for a 
lot of variation across states.203 
 
C. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN AND ACROSS 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 
 
A nearly universal theme in interviews with state officials was 
immense respect for and appreciation of CCIIO’s willingness to work with 
states and be flexible.  Multiple informants commented that working with 
CCIIO was the best experience they ever had interacting with the federal 
government.204 CCIIO staff would go out of their way to work with the 
states and were always available, including returning calls while they were 
technically on vacation.205 One state official compared their experience 
implementing exchanges to Medicare Advantage: 
 
The experience between this and Medicare Advantage has 
just been night and day.  Back in 2006, we were having 
phone calls with CMS at that point where both of us were 
threatening lawsuits on a daily basis.  To actually have as 
much dialogue as we have had and as often as we have 
                                                                                                                                      
203 Interview with senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
204 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (March 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld) (“I’ve 
worked with several federal agencies . . . . And working with CCIIO was unlike 
working with any other federal agency – [demonstrating] flexibility and interest in 
making us successful and collaborating with us.”) Interview with senior official, 
federally run health insurance exchange state (March 20, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld) (“Of the federal regulators we dealt with 
throughout this process, CCIIO ultimately became our best partner.”); Interview 
with senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld) (“There has been a genuine effort to have a supportive 
partnership, probably more so than I have ever seen in my bazillion years working 
with the states and the feds.”). 
205 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state 
with state-run health insurance exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld). 
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had. . . . They would take input, and if they didn’t take it 
they’d tell us why.  For all of us to work together and not 
have it break down has been truly remarkable.  And we’re 
under so much more political pressure now than in 2006.  
That makes it very impressive.206  
 
In particular, many informants highlighted the fact that HHS brought in 
many former state regulators to run CCIIO.207 And, as others have 
previously noted, former Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius herself is a 
former state governor and insurance commissioner.208   
Some officials noted that part of CCIIO’s flexibility also came 
from the fact that it was a new entity, learning new things.209 One advised, 
“[I]f you want to get something done you create new state agency or a new 
federal agencies [sic] and make sure they get support from outlying 
agencies.  If something is just a tweak to system, you can stick it into old 
agency.”210 Many state officials felt that CCIIO embodied a very different 
culture than older federal programs that are more entrenched.211 CCIIO 
staff members were relatively young, and respected the judgment of 
seasoned state regulators212 and brought an upstart, “entrepreneurial spirit” 
                                                                                                                                      
206 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
207 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, state interest group (May 1, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance 
exchange state (May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
208 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 7, at 613; Sandy Praeger, A View from the 
Insurance Commissioner on Health Care Reform, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
186, 192 (2011); Seifter, supra note 11, at 475. 
209 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
210 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
211 E.g., Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview 
with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state 
with state-run health insurance exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and 
affiliation withheld). 
212 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 7, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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to implementation.213 Some state officials expressed frustration with the 
inexperience of some of the staff they were working with,214 but states 
found that CCIIO staff were always been a willingness to “dig in” and try 
to get the job done.215 
Some, but not all, state officials found working with other federal 
entities, particularly IRS, to be more difficult than working with CCIIO: 
“CCIIO is very flexible . . . . They certainly bent over backwards to work 
with us.  But IRS didn’t.  They said here are the rules and we don’t care.”216 
As another official put it, “IRS doesn’t play well with other kids in the 
sandbox.”217 A former federal official attributed it to IRS’s culture and the 
nature of their work: “IRS generally sees things in black and white. They 
very seldom regard an issue as open-ended in a statute . . . . If you are 
doing the tax stuff, you can’t have adaptability.  You need consistency and 
bright lines . . . . Nobody asks, “what do we want to achieve?”218 
Reviews of federal Medicaid officials were mixed.  State officials 
reported that while they were more flexible than IRS, they were also more 
bureaucratic, with a history and tradition that contributed to seeing states 
more as followers than partners.219 One state official indicated that match 
funding under Medicaid contributed to this: the Center for Medicaid and 
CHIP Services (CMCS) “has much more leverage over state Medicaid 
officials than CCIIO does over state regulators.  The conversation is 
completely different.  Getting answers is difficult.  The questions are much 
                                                                                                                                      
213 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
214 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (May 2, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld) (“What has 
bothered me immensely is that we have these very inexperienced people, pack of 
regulators on the federal side, looking at these rules and writing up regulations.”). 
215 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
216 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 19, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
217 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
218 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
219 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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terser from federal officials.”220 In contrast, CCIIO “didn’t seem to be as 
guarded or use their leverage like other entities.”221   
 
D. FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE 
 
In some instances states were able to secure accommodations when 
they were out ahead of the federal government and able to take a first-
mover advantage.  In these cases, the federal government appeared hesitant 
to disrupt functioning markets or to force states to change directions. 
The clearest examples come from Massachusetts and Utah, which 
had moved ahead on establishing exchanges before passage of the ACA. 
Massachusetts’s health care reform initiative served as a model for the 
ACA, but the state faced barriers to full compliance due to differences in 
specific standards.  For example, Massachusetts had distinct individual and 
employer coverage requirements and penalties, more generous subsidies for 
low-to-moderate income families, and more protective age and tobacco 
rating rules.222 Massachusetts had also merged its individual and small 
group market.  While the ACA explicitly did not preempt market mergers, 
Massachusetts found that implementation of the ACA’s rating reforms 
would threaten its ability to maintain a merged market.223 In response to 
Massachusetts’ concerns, CCIIO provided Massachusetts with a three-year 
transition period to phase out certain rating factors that are otherwise 
prohibited under the ACA.224 CCIIO cited its authority to section 1321(e) 
of the ACA, which allows the Secretary “to presume” that certain states 
                                                                                                                                      
220 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
221 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
222 ROBERT W. SEIFERT & ANDREW P. COHEN, CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW & 
ECON., UNIV. OF MASS. MED. SCH., RE-FORMING REFORM: WHAT THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEANS FOR MASSACHUSETTS 7, 9, 
available at http://bluecrossfoundation.org/sites/default/files/062110NHRReport 
FINAL.pdf.   
223 Letter from Joseph G. Murphy to author (Mar. 29, 2013) (on file with 
author) (Regarding patient protection and Affordable Care Act; Health insurance 
market rules; Rate review). 
224 Letter from Gary Cohen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Infor. & 
Ins. Oversight, to Joseph Murphy, Mass. Comm’r of Ins. (Apr. 5, 2013), available 
at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/mwc/CMS-MA-
ACA-waiver.pdf. 
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that operated an exchange before January 1, 2010 meet the ACA’s approval 
standards for establishment of a state-based exchange.225 This arguable 
stretch of the statute, questioned in the media,226 demonstrates the great 
lengths the federal government was willing to go, in certain circumstances, 
to accommodate early moving states.    
Utah had also already established a health insurance exchange for 
small businesses based on legislation that was enacted before passage of 
the ACA.227 Even though Utah refused to operate an ACA-compliant 
individual market exchange, the federal government ultimately decided to 
change its rules to allow Utah to continue operating its own small business 
exchange (Avenue H) while defaulting to a federally run individual market 
exchange, rather than attempt to compete with or preempt Avenue H by 
coming in with a federally run exchange serving both markets.228  
 As an additional example, a state official recounted that when the 
federal government first started talking about conducting plan management 
in states with federally facilitated exchanges, they were planning to build a 
new IT system.229 But most states are already on the System for Electronic 
Rate and Form Filing (SERFF) to facilitate the submission, review, and 
                                                                                                                                      
225 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(e), 42 U.S.C. § 
18041(e) (2012), (“PRESUMPTION FOR CERTAIN STATE—OPERATED 
EXCHANGES.—(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a State operating an 
Exchange before January 1, 2010, and which has insured a percentage of its 
population not less than the percentage of the population projected to be covered 
nationally after the implementation of this Act, that seeks to operate an Exchange 
under this section, the Secretary shall presume that such Exchange meets the 
standards under this section unless the Secretary determines, after completion of 
the process established under paragraph (2), that the Exchange does not comply 
with such standards.(2) PROCESS.--The Secretary shall establish a process to 
work with a State described in paragraph (1) to provide assistance necessary to 
assist the State's Exchange in coming into compliance with the standards for 
approval under this section.”). 
226 See, e.g., Josh Archambault, ACA's Alice in Wonderland Twist: HHS 
Unilateral Delay of Regs for One State, FORBES, (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/04/17/acas-alice-in-wonderland-
twist-hhs-unilateral-delay-of-regs-for-one-state/2/. 
227 H.B. 133, 2008 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (enacted) (created the health 
system reform task force and the Utah health exchange). 
228 See supra Part IV.A. 
229 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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approval of insurance product filings.230 State regulators were concerned 
about duplicative processes and the potential for increased burden on 
insurance companies, if the federal government mandated that they use a 
different system for the federally run exchange than they used to submit 
documents to the state department of insurance.231 Multiple states came 
together and, over time, were able to convince federal officials to allow 
insurers to continue to submit product filings through SERFF rather than 
their alternative system if a state was conducting plan management on 
behalf of the federally run exchange.232 
 More generally, state officials reported that they felt that if they 
came to the federal government with a new idea that was not prohibited 
under the statute or existing rules, the federal government would listen.  
The federal government also seemed to proactively take cues from state 
action: “when the federal regulations [on navigators] came out, they were 
fairly similar to what we had and most states had . . . . A lot of times in 
meetings in person, they’d ask how we were doing things and would take 
notes.”233 A former federal official confirmed this assessment: regarding 
states, “if you answer [a question] one way and defend it as a lawful 
interpretation of the ACA, the federal government won’t go against you.  I 
don’t know of any instance of states being more adventurous when they 
were later told to reverse themselves.”234 While some states took a lack of 
                                                                                                                                      
230 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE SERFF MANDATES (May 7, 2015), 
available at http://www.serff.com/documents/state_participation_mandates.pdf; 
see also About SERFF, SERFF, http://www.serff.com/about.htm (last visited May 
22, 2015). 
231 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
232 See, e.g., Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2015 Letter to Issuers in the Federally-facilitated 
Marketplaces (Mar. 14, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/ 
Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/ 2015-final-issuer-letter-3-14-2014.pdf.  
233 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 11, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
234 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
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answers as cause for inaction on their part,235 “other states saw the lack of 
timely federal guidance as an opportunity.”236 
Looking forward to 2017, the opportunity to apply for waivers 
from the ACA’s exchange and market reform rules may create more 
opportunities for states to indirectly shape federal policy.237 It remains to be 
seen how popular these waivers become, and whether they are typically 
used for large or small changes.  With a waiver option on the table 
however, states may have less incentive to change the rules governing 
exchanges writ large and instead opt out of any rules with which they 
disagree, as has been the case with Medicaid.238 Yet successful waivers can 
set examples that lead to broader reforms, just as the ACA was in many 
ways inspired by a Massachusetts Medicaid waiver.239 
 
V. EVALUATING THE STATE ROLE IN FEDERAL DECISION-
MAKING ON EXCHANGES IN LIGHT OF CHANGING 
DYNAMICS 
 
As the preceding Part demonstrations, states actively engaged in 
the decision-making process and were able to exert influence over at least 
some outcomes.  However, the dynamics that have shaped state influence 
over exchange establishment in the early years of implementation are likely 
to change significantly as we move forward.  Below, this Article briefly 
discusses some of the most significant changes that are on the horizon.  It 
also suggests that some of these changes may encourage states to push for 
more formal procedures for making their voices heard than have dominated 
state-federal interactions to date. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
235 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
236 Interview with former senior federal official (Mar. 24, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld). 
237 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 
18052 (2012) (waiver for state innovation). 
238 Ryan, supra note 10, at 63 (“Over time . . . the waiver program has become 
the standard way that Medicaid is administered, as most states now use the waiver 
provisions to individually tailor the terms of their own Medicaid programs.”). 
239 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 
2005 (2014); Metzger, supra note 7, at 602; Ryan, supra note 10, at 63–64. 
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A. A REBALANCING OF NEGOTIATING POWER 
 
As of 2015, no new federal exchange establishment grants will be 
approved240 and exchanges are required to be financially self-sustaining.241 
While the loss of federal dollars may reduce state incentives to operate 
their own exchanges or to take on additional functions on behalf of 
federally facilitated exchanges, it may also give states more power in 
negotiations with the federal government.  As one state official observed, 
“Right now [in 2014,] it’s all about the grant money . . . . [The federal 
government is] paying for the system one hundred percent.  When the grant 
money runs out, I don’t see that they’ll have the same leverage with 
states.”242 Given that exchanges are the gateway for individuals to access 
premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, the federal government 
will still have a role to play in oversight,243 but it may be more limited than 
what states experience under conditional spending programs, like 
Medicaid.  
State officials emphasized this distinction between exchanges and 
Medicaid, where ongoing federal matching funds can leave states at the 
mercy of the federal government.244 According to one: “With the exchange, 
                                                                                                                                      
240 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(a), 42 U.S.C. § 
18031(a)(4)(B) (2012) (“No grant shall be awarded under this subsection after 
January 1, 2015.”). 
241 Id. §1311(d)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5)(A) (“In establishing an Exchange 
under this section, the State shall ensure that such Exchange is self-sustaining 
beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing the Exchange to charge 
assessments or user fees to participating health insurance issuers, or to otherwise 
generate funding, to support its operations.”). 
242 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
243 For example, the ACA requires state exchanges to keep an accurate 
accounting of its activities, receipts, and expenditures and to report to the Secretary 
of HHS annually. CMS has said that it will use this information “to assist in 
determining if a state is maintaining a compliant operational Exchange,” as well as 
to inform potential changes to priorities and approaches for future years. Agency 
Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 78 
Fed. Reg. 68,851, 68,852 (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-15/pdf/2013-27305.pdf. 
244 E.g., Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with 
senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) 
(interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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it won’t be like that.  Right now it’s all about the grant money . . . . [The 
federal government is] paying for the system one hundred percent.  When 
the grant money runs out, I don’t see that they’ll have the same leverage 
with states.”245 To keep states at the table or to encourage more states to 
elect to transition to state-based exchanges in the future, the federal 
government may need to be more accommodating of state demands than 
they are used to being.  
Despite this potential boost in leverage, however, states may need a 
protected voice at the table going forward to avoid the federal government 
unitarily deciding that it does not want or need to rely on states going 
forward.246 Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have 
argued that states “wield power against a federal government that depends 
on them to administer its programs” and that this leverage “only increases 
after the federal government has devolved regulatory power to the state.”247 
In this case, given the large number of states that have defaulted to a 
federally run exchange, the federal government has only partially devolved 
power.  Perhaps with experience the federal government will determine that 
it can effectively and efficiently operate a centralized exchange without 
relying significantly on states.  Already, experts have calculated that state 
exchanges spent 2.3 times as much per enrollee than the federal 
government (with the most expensive model being partnership 
exchanges).248  
Indeed, Professor Abbe Gluck has argued that cooperative 
federalism programs like health insurance exchanges can serve a “field-
claiming” function249 and enable the expansion of federal power in a 
                                                                                                                                      
245 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
246 As Gluck has observed, “federal agencies have almost unrestrained power 
to make all of the critical allocation decisions. The Court’s most recent statement 
at the intersection of Chevron and federalism, the City of Arlington case . . . , 
extends the deference accorded federal agencies even further, to include questions 
of the agency’s jurisdiction, even when state law would be affected by that 
decision.” Gluck, supra note 239, at 2028 (describing City of Arlington v. FCC, 
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013)).  
247 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1266 (2009). 
248 Amy Lotven, Analysis Finds State Exchanges Spent More Than Twice Per 
Enrollee Than FFE, INSIDE WASH. PUBLISHERS, May 7, 2014 (subscription 
required) (copy on file with author). 
249 Gluck, supra note 131, at 574. 
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“below-the-radar fashion.”250 Some state officials expressed concern that 
the federal government was making moves that could be interpreted to 
usurp or undermine state regulators’ authority, such as the aforementioned 
transition policy allowing the renewal of non-ACA-compliant health plans 
after January 1, 2014.251 NAIC has also recently pushed back against the 
federal government’s proposal to increase scrutiny of health insurer 
provider networks.  In a public letter to the acting director of CCIIO, NAIC 
requested that “[b]efore CCIIO considers any changes to the current federal 
requirements, [it] allow the NAIC time to thoughtfully analyze this issue, 
and that [it] continue to look to the NAIC for guidance and continue to 
recognize the importance of state flexibility.”252 
As state officials shared, the informality of the proceedings 
sometimes limited their ability to protect their interests, as they received 
mixed messages from different contacts253 and were denied access to legal 
justifications of policy decisions.254 Some officials are also worried about 
the security of their current role given that no formal agreements, like 
MOUs, currently exist between states regulators and the federally 
                                                                                                                                      
250 Gluck, supra note 7, at 1756. 
251 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. The federal government 
extended this policy for two years in subsequent guidance, allowing renewals of 
non-ACA-compliant policies up to October 1, 2016. Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., 
Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Insurance Standards Bulletin Series–
Extension of Transitional Policy through October 1, 2016: Extended Transition to 
Affordable Care Act-Compliant Policies (March 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads 
/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf. 
252 Letter from Adam Hamm, Monica J. Lindeen, Michael F. Consedine & 
Sharon P. Clark to Dr. Mandy Cohen, supra note 138. 
253 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); see also, e.g., 
Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance exchange (Mar. 
18, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior 
official, federally run health insurance exchange state (Mar. 20, 2014) (interviewee 
identity and affiliation withheld); Interview with senior official, state with state-run 
health insurance exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation 
withheld); Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange 
state (May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
254 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
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facilitated exchange.255 Additionally, while state officials reported that they 
were able to take advantage of their good relationships with federal 
officials when CCIIO was largely staffed by former state-regulators, there 
is no guarantee that such relationships will continue into the future.  State 
officials expressed concern about the recent departures of many such allies 
and unease about whether their replacements would be as deferential.256 
Looking forward, state officials may feel less secure in their ability to exert 
their influence through informal channels if their federal counterparts do 
not have backgrounds working at the state-level. 
 
B. A CHANGING PACE TO DECISION-MAKING MAY OPEN THE 
DOOR FOR MORE FORMAL PROCEDURES 
 
At least some of the reliance on informal mechanisms appears to 
have arisen from the fast-paced nature of early years of exchange 
establishment.  As previously documented, many proposed rules were not 
released until late in the implementation process, when states were busy 
attempting to implement their own policies and operational systems.  These 
later rules provided increasingly shorter windows to respond, and states 
were given little to no advance notice when they were coming.  State 
officials also had little confidence that their comments would matter if 
submitted, which made it hard for some to justify spending time on 
responding.257 
Arguably, neither the federal government nor the states had time to 
establish and participate in formal advisory groups or negotiated 
rulemaking during the first few years of exchange establishment.  As one 
state official observed, there is a “really big difference between start up and 
ongoing programs.  For states, the first few years were really busy and I 
                                                                                                                                      
255 Interview with senior official, federally run health insurance exchange state 
(May 2, 2014) (interview identity and affiliation withheld). 
256 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, State Regulators 
Meet with President Obama on ACA (Apr. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2014_docs/regulators_meet_with_obama_on_aca.ht
m (“State regulators expressed concern about the lack of insurance regulatory 
expertise with HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’ departure and recommended that 
the appointment of a permanent director of the Center for Consumer Information 
and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) be done quickly, and that the new director should 
rely on the expertise of state insurance regulators as decisions are made.”). 
257 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Mar. 21, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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think everyone was just doing as much as they could . . . . There just wasn’t 
time to put together formal advisory groups.”258 They also noted that the 
lack of a stable group of people working on exchanges at the state level in 
the early years also likely hampered any effort to create formal advisory 
groups.259 
 Going forward, however, the federal government should have a 
cadre of experienced state exchange officials available to inform its 
policies and more time to engage in formal deliberations with them.  The 
federal government could establish standing advisory committees to 
oversee the long-term operation of the exchange program and use 
negotiated rulemaking when new rules or amendments to existing rules are 
required. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
States have played a critical role in the development of federal 
policy and operational rules governing exchanges.  They have been able to 
provide input through formal and informal channels, and, at times, leverage 
third parties including state interest groups to amplify their voice.  The 
federal government has not always accommodated state requests, but, for 
the most part, has been willing to listen to their opinions.  While informal 
communication channels have been particularly important in early years, 
changing dynamics may lead states to push for a more formal seat at the 
table in the near future.   
                                                                                                                                      
258 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
259 Interview with senior official, state with state-run health insurance 
exchange (Apr. 26, 2014) (interviewee identity and affiliation withheld). 
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Appendix A. Methodology 
  
This Article is informed by a broad range of resources.  It examines 
among other things, federal rulemaking pertaining to health insurance 
exchanges and state comments submitted in response to these rules and 
other solicitations published in the Federal Register.  This process 
inherently involved arbitrary decisions over how broadly to define 
“exchange-related.”  In some cases, I have chosen to include arguably 
tangential rules, such as rules primarily governing things such as Medicaid 
eligibility,260 premium tax credit eligibility,261 and premium stabilization 
programs,262 because they were released at the same approximate time as 
rules directly governing exchanges and states frequently responded to them 
collectively.  In addition, some rules were issued as “omnibus” rules and 
while they may predominantly deal with issues not specific to exchanges, 
they address some provisions that tie back to exchanges.263 Appendix B 
                                                                                                                                      
260 Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 
2010; Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,148 (proposed Aug. 17, 2011) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 433, 435, 457); Medicaid Program; Eligibility 
Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,144 
(proposed Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 457). 
261 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931 (proposed Aug. 
17, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Health Insurance Premium Tax 
Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (proposed May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 602); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 78 Fed. Reg. 7,264 (proposed 
Feb. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Minimum Value of Eligible 
Employer-Sponsored Plans and Other Rules Regarding the Health Insurance 
Premium Tax Credit, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,909 (proposed May 3, 2013) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
262 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to 
Reinsurance, Risk Corridors, and Risk Adjustment, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,930 (proposed 
July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors, and Risk 
Adjustment, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,220 (proposed Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 153). 
263 See, e.g., Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges: 
Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair 
Hearing and Appeal Processes for Medicaid and Exchange Eligibility Appeals and 
Other Provisions Related to Eligibility and Enrollment for Exchanges, Medicaid 
and CHIP, and Medicaid Premiums and Cost Sharing, 78 Fed. Reg. 4,594 
(proposed Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 433, 435, 440, 
447, 457, 45 C.F.R. pt. 155); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: 
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includes information on the rules and other solicitations that I reviewed for 
this Article.  
 The process of finding state responses to comment solicitations 
posted in the Federal Register is also somewhat imprecise.  Public 
comments are typically posted on Regulations.gov shortly after their 
submissions.  While submission forms typically include a field where 
respondents can identify themselves (e.g., individual, academic, health care 
association, state government, etc.), comments are not sortable by these 
categories.  In some cases, upwards of multiple thousands of responses 
were submitted to exchange-related solicitations.  I have attempted to be 
thorough in my review of responses to identify comments from state 
officials or state interest groups, such as the NAIC.  However, it is possible 
that I missed some due to my own error or technical errors with the 
website.  
I also had to draw lines over what I chose to collect and report on. 
For this Article, I counted any comments submitted by state governors’ 
offices or administrative agencies (such as departments of insurance or 
Medicaid agencies), state-based exchanges, and any legislative committees 
or task forces formed specifically to consider or monitor health care reform 
implementation.  I did not include comments from individual state 
legislators, members of Congress, or local or municipal entities. 
Furthermore, the state response numbers I report below are based on 
whether any of the counted state entities responded to a solicitation.  
Frequently, multiple entities within a state would submit letters (or a single 
entity may submit multiple comment letters or documents).  I do not 
individually count each of these instances. Appendix C documents these 
findings. 
 In addition, I conducted interviews with twenty state officials, two 
representatives of state interest groups, and two former federal officials to 
inform my findings and observations.264 State officials include 
representatives of both state-based exchanges and the different variations of 
federally facilitated exchanges.  Because of the sensitive nature of some of 
                                                                                                                                      
Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair 
Hearing and Appeal Processes, and Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: 
Eligibility and Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160 (proposed July 15, 2013) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447, 457, 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 
156). 
264 I also contacted a small number of current federal officials requesting 
interviews, but did not receive any responses. 
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their disclosures I have attempted to anonymize any quotes.  Any 
references to specific states are based on publicly available information. 
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Appendix B. Federal Rulemaking & Solicitations, March 23, 2010 - May 
30, 2014 
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Health Insurance 
Exchanges; Approval 
of an Application by 
the Accreditation 
Association for 
Ambulatory Health 
Care (AAAHC) To 
Be a Recognized 
Accrediting Entity 
for the Accreditation 
of QHPs 
FN CMS 2013-
Dec-23 
N N/A N 
PPACA; HHS Notice 
of Benefit & Payment 
Parameters for 2015; 
FR 
FR CMS 2014-
Mar-11 
N N/A Y 
PPACA; Third Party 
Payment of QHP 
Premiums 
IFR CMS 2014-
Mar-19 
Y 60 Y 
PPACA; Exchange 
and Insurance 
Market Standards 
for 2015 & Beyond; 
PR 
PR CMS 2014-
Mar-21 
Y 31 Y 
Information 
Reporting for 
Affordable Insurance 
Exchanges 
FR IRS 2014-
May-07 
N N/A N 
PPACA; Exchange & 
Insurance Market 
Standards for 2015 & 
Beyond; FR 
FR CMS 2014-
May-27 
N N/A Y 
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CHIP=Children’s Health Insurance Programs 
CMS=Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
EHB=Essential Health Benefit 
FIS=Federalism Impact Statement  
FN=Final Notice 
FR=Final Rule 
HHS=Department of Health and Human Services 
IFR=Interim Final Rule 
IRS=Internal Revenue Services 
N=Notice 
NPRM=Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
NWC=Notice with Comment 
OCIIO=Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight 
PR=Proposed Rule 
PPACA= Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
QHP=Qualified Health Plan 
RFC=Request for Comments 
RFI=Request for Information 
SHOP=Small Business Health Options Program 
 
* The original comment period for this proposed rule was seventy-five 
days.  However, the federal government subsequently extended it to 108 
days. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, and Standards Related to 
Reinsurance, Risk Corridors and Risk Adjustment; Extension of Comment 
Period, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,788–89 (Sept. 30, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
153, 155, 156). 
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Appendix C. State Participation in Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
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AL X - - - X X X - - - - - - X - - - - - - X X - 
AK - - - - - X - - - - X - - X - - - - - - - - - 
AZ - - - X - X - X - - X - X X - X - - - - - - - 
AR X - X - - X - - - - X - - X - - - - - X - - - 
CA X - X X X X X X - - X - X X X X - - - X - X - 
CO X - X - X X X - - - X X - X - X - - X - - X - 
CT - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - X - - 
DE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DC - - X X X X X - - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - 
FL - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - 
GA - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - X X - 
HI - - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - X - 
ID - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - X X - 
IL X - X X - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - 
IN - X X X X X X - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
IA - - X X X X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
KS - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - X X - 
KY - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - 
LA X - X - X X - X X - X - X X - X - - - - X - - 
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ME X - X X - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - X - - 
MD X - X - X X X - - X X - X X - - - X - - - X - 
MA - X - X X X X - - - X - X X X - - X X - - X - 
MI - - X X X X X - - - - - - X - - - - - - X X - 
MN - X X X X X X - - X X - X X - - - - X - X - - 
MS - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - - 
MO - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
MT X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
NE - - X - X X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X X - 
NV X - X X X - X - - - - - - X X X X - - - - - - 
NH - - X - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
NJ - - X - - X - X - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
NM X - X - - X - - - - X - - X - - - - - - - X - 
NY X - X X X X X X X X - X X X - X - - - X - X X 
NC - - - - - - X - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
ND - - - - - X - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - 
OH X - X - X X - - - - X - - X - - - - - - - X - 
OK - - X X X X X - - - X - X X - X - - - - X X - 
OR X - X X X X X X X - X - X X - X - - X X - X - 
PA - X - - - X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
RI - - X - X X X - - - X - - X - - - - - - - - - 
SC - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - 
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SD - - X - X X - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
TN X - X X X X X X X - - - X X - - - - - - - - - 
TX X - X - - X - X X - - - - X - - - - - - X X - 
UT X - X X X X X - - - X - X X - - - X - - - - - 
VT - X X - - X X - - - - - - X - - - - - - - X - 
VA - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - - - X - - 
WA X - X X X X X - - - X - - X - X - X - - X X - 
WV X - X - - - - - - - X - - X - - - - - - X - - 
WI X X X X X X X - - - - - X X - - - - - X - X - 
WY - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - - - 
 
  

